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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
TROY MICHAEL KELL, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
: Case No. 20070234 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent. 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Kell appeals from an order and judgment denying post-conviction relief from his 
aggravated murder conviction and resulting death sentence. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (West 2004). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The jury saw a videotape of Kell stabbing Lonnie Blackmon sixty-seven times, 
including in the eyes. It heard about Kell's extensive history of violence and threats of 
violence while incarcerated. It knew that Kell murdered Blackmon while serving a life-
without-parole sentence. Was there any reasonable likelihood that anything counsel could 
have done Kell may have resulted in a conviction of something less than capital murder or 
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sentence less than death? 
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly deny post-conviction relief on claims that 
Kell raised and lost on direct appeal? 
3. Did the post-conviction court correctly deny post-conviction relief on Kell's claims 
that his counsel should have challenged the death-qualification process or the trial court's 
reasonable doubt definition? 
4. On direct appeal, this Court rejected Kell's claim that it should reverse Kell's 
conviction and sentence because he was tried in the prison courtroom. Kell lost. Did the 
post-conviction court correctly deny post-conviction relief on Kell's claim that his trial 
counsel should have sought interlocutory review on that issue? 
5. Did the post-conviction court correctly assign the summary judgment burdens 
between Kell and the State and correctly grant summary judgment on Kell's ineffective-
assistance claims? 
Because the post-conviction court disposed of Kell's petition on summary judgment, 
this Court reviews the judgment against Kell for correctness, viewing the facts and all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Kell. See, e.g., Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 
UT 50^7, 94 P.3d 915. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-104 through 106, and Utah R. Civ. P. 65C 
are in addendum A. 
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CASE STATEMENT1 
The murder 
Kell committed his first murder in Nevada. A Nevada jury sentenced Kell to life 
without the possibility of parole. (X5051,5132; XIII5625-26.) 
In June 1993, Nevada transferred Kell to the Utah State Prison (VII4588; X5074). 
On May 21, 1994, two fights broke out: one between white inmate John Cannistraci and 
black inmate Mounir Nafka, and a second between white inmate Paul Payne, Cannistraci's 
friend, and black inmate Lonnie Blackmon, Nafka's cellmate. (VIII4777, 4814-16, 4787, 
4822.) 
After guards stopped the second fight with a fire hose, one ordered Blackmon and 
Payne to shake hands. They obeyed. However, Blackmon "sucker punched" Payne from 
behind as Payne returned to his cell. Payne ran upstairs to Kell's cell, picked up a shank, and 
ran back downstairs. By then Blackmon had been locked back into his cell. (VIII4817-19, 
4823-24.) 
On July 5,1994, Kell and his accomplices, Eric Daniels and Payne, submitted medical 
request slips to visit the infirmary. Daniels also forged a slip to transport Blackmon to the 
]The record from the underlying criminal case contains 12 pleadings files 
paginated chronologically. The State refers to the criminal pleadings file as "KIR" (KI 
for Kell I). There are approximately 47 transcript volumes in the criminal file. The 
district court clerk assigned individual record numbers to all the transcript pages, but they 
are not numbered chronologically. The State refers to the criminal-case pretrial 
transcripts as "T." The State refers to the criminal trial transcripts by their Roman 
numeral, e.g., "1X4882." Citations to the post-conviction record will be to "KIIR." 
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infirmary. State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106 If 3, 61 P.3d 1019. 
During the transport, Kell, who had made a handcuff key out of plastic kitchen 
utensils, removed his handcuffs. Kell stabbed Blackmon, who was still in handcuffs, in the 
chest, back, neck, face, and eyes. Daniels and Payne restrained Blackmon during the attack. 
Kell returned to resume the attack after twice walking away. Id. at fflf 5-6. After killing 
Blackmon, Kell strutted around the room, yelling "White Power" and "[I've] been killin' 
niggers ever since [I] was an itty-bitty Aryan." (VII4720-22; XI5307-08; State's criminal 
Exhibit 3.) 
The medical examiner, Dr. Maureen Frikke, counted sixty-seven stab wounds, 
including twenty-six on the face and chin, twenty-seven on the neck, and nine to Blackmon's 
eyes.2 Dr. Frikke believed that a stab wound under the right ear that severed Blackmon's 
carotid artery caused Blackmon's death. (1X4870, 4874, 4877, 4880-89.) 
A video tape captured the entire murder. Kell, 2002 UT 106 \ 29. 
The criminal trial and direct appeal. 
The State charged Kell with capital murder. After holding two evidentiary hearings, 
the trial court determined to hold the trial at the Central Utah Correctional Facility courtroom 
to address security concerns particular to Kell. Id. at \ 7. 
At trial, Kell testified that he killed Blackmon because he believed that statements he 
2Kell cut through Blackmon's eyelids to the bone, perforated the left eyeball, and 
cut through the nasal bone into the nasal cavity. 
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overheard from Blackmon were a threat directed at him even though Blackmon made no 
threatening gestures toward Kell. Id. at % 8-9.3 
After hearing evidence and viewing the videotape, the jury convicted Kell of capital 
murder. Id. at ffif 9, 29-31. 
At the penalty hearing, the State introduced evidence of Kell's extensive history of 
violence and threats of violence while incarcerated in both Nevada and Utah. For example, 
while incarcerated in Nevada, Kell offered to pay a new female guard to smuggle an ounce 
of marijuana into the prison. The guard reported Kell's request to her supervisors. Kell then 
told her that "he was gonna cut [her] throat" and "popped open his food slot" "to let [her] 
know that he could get to [her] when he wanted to." Kell warned that "he [had] a lot of 
inmates on the yard who [would] kill [her]." Kell also warned that "he had a life sentence, 
so it didn't matter that he was gonna cut [her] head off." (XIII5515-22.) 
Another Nevada guard testified that Kell threw a hot liquid substance at him through 
his food slot, causing first degree burns on the guard's thigh, abdomen, and groin. He 
testified that Kell beat another inmate about the face and throat, and that Kell stopped the 
beating only after a guard chambered a round into his shotgun and ordered Kell to the 
ground. (XIII5531-33.) 
Yet another Nevada guard testified that Kell and another white inmate assaulted a 
3The trial court declined Kell's request for an imperfect self-defense manslaughter 
instruction, but granted Kell's request for an extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter 
instruction. Id. 
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black inmate by kicking and punching him. Kell continued the assault even after the guard 
issued a verbal warning and fired a warning shot. Kell stopped only after the guard shot him 
in the legs. (XIII5575-76.) 
Kell at least twice threatened to harm a Utah prison guard who had searched his cell. 
On the second occasion, Kell smashed his elbow against the glass in his cell door and yelled, 
"I'll get you with my elbow. I've taken out guys before. I'll waste you. I'll get you." 
(XIII5551-53, 5555-56.) 
Another CUCF guard told how a cuffed, belted, and shackled Kell jumped in the air 
and, for no apparent reason, struck another inmate in the chin with his elbow, knocking the 
other inmate to the ground (XIII5601-03). 
Another CUCF guard testified that Kell repeatedly struck an inmate while a third 
inmate held the victim's arms, inflicting severe bruising to both temples, the left cheek, upper 
lip, nose, and left eye, and causing the inmate's middle left finger and elbow to swell. 
(XIII5580-82.) 
Kell also head-butted a CUCF guard, striking him in the face, lower nose, and upper 
lip, causing a nose bleed and a raw lip (XIII5592). 
Officers searching Kell's cell often found contraband, demonstrating that Kell posed 
a security risk. For example, guards found a document entitled "Reconnaissance 88," which 
contained several references to the Utah Corrections SWAT team, their scheduled 
movements, the number of SWAT team members on duty at any given time, and the gear and 
-6-
weapons used that the team used. (XIII5551, 5558, 5607-08, 5619.) 
In another search, guards discovered that Kell had removed the silicone caulking from 
his window. This would have made it possible for Kell to remove the window, making it 
easier to attack guards or providing Kell with material to make a weapon. (XIII5609.) 
The State also presented evidence of Kell's first murder. Kell shot James Kelly six 
times in the face at close range. (XIII5626-27; State's criminal Exhibit 47). 
Larry Blackmon, the victim's brother, read a short statement on behalf of the 
Blackmon family. (XIII5630-32.) 
Kell called Sandy Shaw, his accomplice in the Kelly murder. Shaw testified that she 
grew up next door to Kell and viewed him as an older brother. She testified that she asked 
Kell to beat up Kelly because, when Shaw was fifteen, Kelly had been harassing her and 
asked her to let him photograph her nude. (XIV5641-5647.) 
Kell, Shaw, and another man lured Kelly into the desert, where Kell murdered him. 
(XIV5646-52.) Shaw claimed that they had not planned to shoot Kelly. However, she 
acknowledged that, after the murder, they divided up the $ 1000 dollars in Kelly's wallet and 
drove off in Kelly's car with Kell at the wheel. She also agreed that Kell did not seem upset 
that he had just killed someone. (XIV5653-54.) 
Kell also presented videotaped depositions of two Nevada inmates. Both testified that 
Kell was not a racist, only a separatist, and that prisoners under life-without-parole sentences 
have few options. They explained that threats from other prisoners had to be taken seriously, 
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that the prison code prohibits going to guards to resolve problems with other inmates, and 
that Kell had no choice but to kill Blackmon before Blackmon killed him. (XIV5655-56; 
T5931:3-5, 10-12, 14-17, 19; T5964:3-4, 11-13.) 
Kell's mother testified that he had always been "strong willed," but that he had been 
a "cheerful happy kid." Kell's parents divorced when he was seven, and Kell had a difficult 
time accepting the divorce. Kell, who loved both parents, was allowed open visitation with 
both. Both parents and Kell's stepfather loved him, despite some trouble he caused when 
growing up. (XIV5666-69.)4 
Finally, defense counsel called Vicky Gregory, Ph.D., who testified that Kell's family 
was dysfunctional and chaotic, and that his father had physically abused him. Kell, however, 
reported to another psychologist that he was offended by and disagreed with this 
characterization, and adamantly denied that his parents caused any of his behaviors. (X5244-
45; XI5329-30.) 
Kell made an unsworn statement to the jury. He expressed his remorse to Blackmon's 
family and offered his own life if that would bring them peace. He cried off and on 
throughout the statement. However, after Kell finished, the State called the prison guards 
who escorted Kell to court. They testified that, just prior to Kell taking the stand, he told 
4Kell also presented his prison caseworker's notes, reciting that, a few months 
before trial, Kell stated 1hat "he felt that he had made a bad mistake at CUCF." The 
caseworker also observed that Kell seemed to be "somewhat emotional" and to have 
genuine concerns about his future. (XIV5661-62.) 
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them, "I'm gonna win an academy award for this one." (XIV5673-79, 5682-84.) 
The jury sentenced Kell to death. Kell, 2002 UT 106 f 9. 
On direct appeal, Kell's opening and reply briefs spanned 347 pages and raised 
numerous claims. This Court rejected them all and affirmed Kell's conviction and sentence. 
Kell, 2002 UT 106. 
The post-conviction case. 
On April 29,2003, the lower court appointed counsel to represent Kell in his the post-
conviction case (Tr. April 29, 2003 (this transcript does not have a record number). On 
August 1, 2005, Kell filed the amended petition for post-conviction relief at issue here 
(KIIR252-272, 275-77 (addendum B)). The State moved for and the post-conviction court 
granted summary judgment (KIIR290-410, 503-77, 605-631 (addendum C)). 
Kell timely filed this appeal (KIIR635-36). 
The State recites additional relevant facts and procedural history in the argument 
sections to which they apply. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
1. Kell could not have proven prejudice. All of Kell's post-conviction claims 
resolved to ineffective-assistance claims. Therefore, Kell would have had to prove that, but 
for counsel's alleged errors, there would have been a reasonable probability that the jury 
would have acquitted him of capital murder or would have sentenced him to something less 
than death. Kell could not have met that burden. 
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The jury saw a videotape of Kell stabbing Lonnie Blackmon sixty-seven times. They 
saw him twice walk away from Blackmon, then return to inflict more wounds. There was no 
substantial question about KelPs guilt. 
As to the penalty, the jury saw the brutal attack, which included stab wounds to 
Blackmon's eyes. It heard Kell's history of extensive violence and threats of violence while 
incarcerated. The jury knew that Kell murdered Blackmon while serving the next lowest 
sentence allowed by law. Thus, the jury that had to decide whether to give Kell a sentence 
less than death knew that all means to deter Kell's violence short of a death sentence had been 
exhausted to no avail. Nothing that Kell's counsel could have done would have saved Kell's 
life. 
2. Procedurally barred claims. The post-conviction court correctly ruled that five 
of Kell's claims were procedurally barred because Kell raised and lost them on direct appeal. 
Kell has not demonstrated otherwise. Kell argues that the post-conviction court should have 
allowed him to proceed to the claims' merits because 1) he could and did rely on his counsel's 
alleged ineffective assistance to avoid the procedural bar; 2) all five claims alleged 
constitutional defects in his trial; and 3) Oregon law not available at the time of his direct 
appeal would have supported his challenge to trying him in the CUCF courtroom. None of 
these arguments demonstrates reversible error. 
The ineffective-assistance procedural-bar exception does not apply to previously raised 
and lost claims. The relevant subsections of section 106 and this Court's precedent make 
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clear that the ineffective-assistance exception applies only to claims that could have been, but 
were not raised at trial or on direct appeal. 
Even if an ineffective-assistance exception applied, Kell did not make a sufficient 
showing of ineffective assistance to avoid the procedural bar. On all but one claim, he 
merely concludes without any analysis that he could proceed on the barred claims under an 
ineffective-assistance theory. Appellant's Brief at 14. Merely incanting "ineffective 
assistance" will not defeat a procedural bar. 
As to his claim that counsel ineptly handled the issue of trying him at the CUCF 
courtroom, Kell does argue that he "detailed [for the post-conviction court] approximately 
four pages worth of efforts that could and should have been made to block the trial being 
held at the CUCF." Appellant' Brief at 23. However, in those "approximately four pages 
worth of efforts," Kell cited no authority available to his trial and appellate counsel that made 
any of those areas of inquiry integral to opposing trial in the CUCF courtroom. Further, Kell 
only cited areas of potential investigation. He proffered to the post-conviction court no 
evidence of what the investigation, if done, would have revealed. 
Kell erroneously cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-104 for the proposition that alleging 
a constitutional violation defeats the procedural bar. Section 104 lists the kinds of claims that 
may justify post-conviction relief, including that the conviction or sentence violates the Utah 
or United States constitutions. However, section 104 makes clear that relief under those 
claims is available only if the claim is not procedurally barred. Thus, constitutional claims 
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are subject to rather than exempt from the procedural bar provision. 
Finally, the State agrees that a claim for post-conviction relief based on post-appeal, 
retroactive, controlling law will not be procedurally barred: such a claim could not have 
raised on direct appeal. However, the post-conviction court did not plainly err by failing to 
reassess sua sponte the issue of trying Kell at CUCF based on post-appeal Oregon Supreme 
Court authority. The PCRA permits post-conviction relief only for retroactive new rules of 
law pronounced by the Unites States Supreme Court, this Court, and the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-104(2) (West 2004). It does not permit post-conviction 
relief for new rules of law pronounced by sister state courts. 
3. Ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the death-qualification process 
or the trial court's reasonable doubt definitions. The post-conviction court denied relief 
on Kell's claim that his appellate counsel should have challenged the death-qualification 
process and the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction. That ruling was correct. 
Kell's own admission to the post-conviction court defeated his death-qualification 
claim. Counsel performs deficiently only when he fails to identify and argue existing law. 
Kell admitted that his appellate counsel had no authority available to him that would have 
supported a challenge to the death-qualification process. 
As to the reasonable doubt definitions, Kell identified for the post-conviction no 
defect that he believed appellate counsel should have argued. Kell cited to the post-
conviction court no authority available to appellate counsel that should have alerted him to 
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any unidentified defect or that would have supported an appellate challenge. 
For the first time in this appeal, Kell argues that the trial court's 1996 reasonable 
doubt definition mirrored one that this Court purportedly found to be "reversible error" in 
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. However, Reyes could not have supported his 
ineffective-assistance claim. First, Reyes was not available to counsel because this Court 
decided it approximately seven years after the trial court instructed the jury and three years 
after this Court affirmed Kell's conviction and sentence. Second, contrary to Keifs 
assertion, this Court did not find that the Reyes instruction misdefined reasonable doubt. 
Keifs argument that his counsel should have raised these claims because counsel must 
raise every possible claim fails under this Court's and the United States Supreme Court's 
controlling authority. Similarly, Kell's argument that he has established prejudice because 
this Court never heard the claims on direct appeal misstates the prejudice standard. Kell had 
to prove that the omitted appellate claims probably would have succeeded, not merely that 
this Court never heard the argument. 
4. Failure to seek interlocutory review of the order to try Kell at CUCF. Kell 
claimed that his trial counsel should have sought interlocutory review of the trial court's 
decision to try him in the CUCF courtroom. The post-conviction court rejected the claim; 
Kell has not demonstrated that the court erred. First, Kell did not oppose summary judgment 
on this claim. Therefore, he waived any appellate argument that the post-conviction court 
erroneously granted it. 
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Second, the claim clearly failed because Kell could not have establish prejudice. 
Appellate counsel challenged the decision to try Kell at the CUCF courtroom on plenary, 
post-judgment review. This Court rejected his challenge. If appellate counsel had asked the 
Court to review the issue sooner and the Court had granted that request, Kell only would 
have lost sooner rather than later. 
5. Specific ineffective assistance claims. Kell argues that the post-conviction court 
misapplied the summary judgment standard to shift the burden to him. He then proceeds to 
argue that the court erroneously granted summary judgment on several of his ineffective-
assistance claims. For the first time on post-conviction appeal, he also argues that all of his 
allegations demonstrate per se ineffective assistance. 
The post-conviction court correctly assigned to the State and to Kell their respective 
burdens under the law governing summary judgment practice. The State met its initial 
burden of supporting its factual assertions with evidence by citing to the record in the 
underlying criminal case. The burden then shifted to Kell to make his best showing in 
support of his ineffective-assistance claims. He had to do so by proffering the evidence on 
which he would rely; he could not rest on mere allegations and denials, and he could not 
withhold his evidence until the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing. The post-
conviction court correctly recognized and applied those principles. 
Further, the post-conviction court correctly ruled that Kell established no material fact 
issue and that all of his ineffective-assistance claims failed as a matter of law. Although Kell 
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now argues that counsel were per se ineffective, he cites no authority to support that 
proposition. Rather, Kell had the burden of proffering sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 
material fact issue on both Strickland elements. He failed to do so, relying instead on bare 
allegations and denials. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY SAW A VIDEOTAPE OF THE MURDER THAT KELL 
COMMITTED AND KNEW THAT HE COMMITTED IT WHILE HE 
WAS SERVING THE MOST SEVERE SENTENCE SHORT OF 
DEATH; KELL HAS NOT AND CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THAT 
ANY ERROR BY COUNSEL PREJUDICED HIM 
All of Kell's post-conviction claims resolved to ineffective-assistance claims, at best.5 
Therefore, Kell had to prove that, but for counsel's errors, if any, there would have been a 
reasonable probability that the jury would acquitted him of capital murder or would have 
sentenced him to something less than death. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 
(1984). 
Kell never could have met that burden. There was no substantial question about 
Kell's guilt. The jury saw a videotape of Kell stabbing Blackmon sixty-seven times. They 
saw him twice walk away from Blackmon, then return to inflict more wounds. 
Similarly, there was no substantial question about the penalty Kell should receive. In 
addition to seeing the brutal attack, which included stab wounds to Blackmon's eyes, the 
5As detailed in point II, Kell could not rely on trial and appellate counsel's alleged 
ineffective assistance to relitigate the claims that he raised and lost at trial and on direct 
appeal. 
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jury heard KelPs history of extensive violence and threats of violence while incarcerated. 
It knew that revenge and racial hatred motivated the murder. It knew that Kell murdered a 
fellow inmate while housed in a maximum security unit. The jury knew that Kell murdered 
Blackmon while serving the next lowest sentence allowed by law: life without the possibility 
of parole. The jury also knew that Kell's LWOP sentence actually encouraged Kell's 
violence because Kell perceived that he had nothing to lose. The irrefutable evidence 
established beyond all doubt Kell's future dangerousness, which is a highly aggravating 
sentencing factor. S. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors 
Think? ("Garvey"), 1998 Columbia L. Rev. 1538, 1559 (summarizing the then available 
results of the capital jury project, which showed that capital jurors found future 
dangerousness to be "highly aggravating"). The jury that had to decide whether to give Kell 
a sentence less than death knew that all means to deter Kell's violence short of a death 
sentence had been exhausted to no avail. Nothing Kell's counsel could have done would 
have saved Kell's life. 
Because Kell never could have proven Stricklandiprejudice, his post-conviction claims 
all failed as a matter of law. 
II. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT 
COULD NOT GRANT POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ON CLAIMS 
THAT KELL RAISED AND LOST ON DIRECT APPEAL6 
In his amended petition, Kell claimed that the trial court violated his constitutional 
6This point responds to Kell's point I. 
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rights by 1) trying him in the CUCF courtroom; 2) removing two prospective jurors who 
were not death qualified; 3) denying his for-cause challenges to three prospective jurors; 4) 
allowing the jury to see the videotape of Kell murdering Blackmon; and 5) admitting the 
autopsy report into evidence (KIIR254-66.) Kell raised and lost all of these claims on direct 
appeal. Kell, 2002 UT 106 ffif 11-21, 29-31, 39-40. The post-conviction court granted 
summary judgment on them, recognizing that a petitioner may not obtain post-conviction 
relief for claims that he raised and lost on direct appeal, and that the ineffective-assistance 
exception does not apply (KIIR608-10). 
That ruling was correct. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act bars post-conviction 
relief for claims that were raised and lost at trial or on direct appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004). Applying that proscription, this Court has recognized that 
"[c]laims that were brought on direct appeal are ineligible for consideration in post-
conviction actions." Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73 f 44, 586 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. 
Kell has demonstrated no error in the post-conviction court's ruling. Kell first argues 
that he was "able to raise any and all issues that were laid out in his petition under [Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35-106(2)], i.e., ineffective assistance of counsel." Appellant's Brief at 14. 
Kell is wrong. 
The relevant subsections of section 106 bar post-conviction relief on "any ground that: 
. . . (b) was raised or addressed at trial or an appeal; [or] (c) could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) and (c) (West 2004). 
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Section 106 further provides that "fnjotwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be 
eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-106(2) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Thus, the ineffective-assistance 
procedural-bar exception applies only to claims that could have been, but were not raised in 
the criminal proceedings. No exception applies to claims that were litigated and lost on 
direct appeal. Therefore, Kell's reliance on alleged ineffective assistance to avoid the 
litigation-and-lost procedural bar is misplaced. 
This Court similarly has recognized that the ineffective-assistance exception applies 
only to overlooked claims, but not to raised and lost claims. In Lafferty, after holding that 
litigated and lost claims are not eligible for post-conviction relief, this Court continued that 
"a claim that could have been brought on direct appeal may not be reviewed unless the 
defendant's failure to bring the claim was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel," 
citing sections 106(l)(c) and (2). Lqfferty, 2007 UT 73 ^ 44.7 
Even if an ineffective-assistance exception applied to the litigated- and-lost procedural 
bar, Kell has not demonstrated that he proffered sufficient evidence or cited sufficient 
authority to the post-conviction court to excuse the bar. First, on all but one claim, he merely 
7This Court's pre-PCRA common law rule similarly provided that "issues raised 
and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or sentence cannot be raised again in 
[post-conviction]. Such issues are dismissed as an abuse of the writ, without a ruling on 
the merits." Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96 \ 6, 44 P.3d 626 (citations omitted). 
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concludes without any analysis that he could proceed on the barred claims under an 
ineffective-assistance theory. Appellant's Brief at 14. However, merely incanting 
"ineffective assistance" will not defeat a procedural bar. In Lafferty, this Court rejected 
Lafferty's reliance on the ineffective-assistance procedural-bar exception in part because 
Lafferty pointed to no evidence of constitutionally deficient performance or of prejudice, and 
because Lafferty could not rely a mere repetition of the Strickland standard. See Lafferty, 
2007 UT 73 ff 48-51. Similarly, Kell's bare use of the ineffective-assistance label cannot 
defeat the procedural bar. 
As to the one remaining claim - that counsel ineptly handled the issue of trying the 
case at the CUCF courtroom - Kell complains that the post-conviction court should not have 
granted summary judgment because he "detailed [for the post-conviction court] 
approximately four pages worth of efforts that could and should have been made to block the 
trial being held at the CUCF." Appellant' Brief at 23.8 Still, that detail was insufficient to 
avoid summary judgment even if the ineffective-assistance exception applied. 
To avoid summary judgment, Kell had to make his "best showing" on his burden of 
proving ineffective assistance. See Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462 
8Kell makes this argument in connection with his claim that the post-conviction 
court should not have dismissed his change-of-venue claim. Id. However, the change-of-
venue claim that he identifies in his brief challenged counsel's handling of motions to 
move the trial out of Sanpete county, not the challenges to holding the trial in the CUCF 
courtroom (KIIR266). As to the claim about moving the trial from Sanpete county, Kell 
makes no argument in this Court about why the the post-conviction court should not have 
granted summary judgment. 
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(Utah 1960) (summary judgment has a "salutary purpose in our procedure because it 
eliminates the time, trouble and expense of a trial when, upon the best showing the plaintiff 
can make, he would not be entitled to a judgment"). To prove ineffective assistance, Kell 
first would have had to prove that counsel's representation was objectively deficient. See, 
e.g-, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 525 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690; 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). In order to 
meet that burden, he would have had to overcome a "strong presumption" that counsel 
rendered constitutionally sufficient assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Lafferty, 2007 
UT 73 U 12; State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 833 
(1998). Kell also would have had to prove that, but for counsel's constitutionally deficient 
performance, there would be a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 695. 
Kell's "approximately four pages worth of efforts" that he claims trial counsel "could 
and should have [expended] to block the trial being held at the CUCF" consisted of 
allegations that counsel should have 1) preserved exhibits that "would reflect or document 
the various courtrooms being discussed"; 2) made a record of secure courtrooms that would 
have addressed the State's security concerns; 3) provided maps to show whether the 
courtrooms were in rural or urban areas; 4) provided maps or videos to demonstrate how the 
public would reach the facilities; 5) made a record of the courtrooms' dimensions or physical 
layout (including furniture placement); 6) made a record of courtroom amenities, such as 
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storage lockers, bathroom facilities, fire code room capacity, etc.; 7) made a record of the 
courtrooms' appearance, including the difference in the quality of courtroom furnishings and 
"official courtroom regalia;" 8) made a record of how a person gets into the courtroom; 9) 
made a record about whether the CUCF facility complied with OSHA and ADA 
requirements; 10) preserved evidence about whether the facility carried premises liability 
insurance; and 11) obtained records of any investigations by the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches (KIIR464-73). However, Kell cited no authority available to his trial and 
appellate counsel that made any of these areas of inquiry integral to opposing trial in the 
CUCF courtroom.9 
Further, Kell only cited areas of potential investigation. However, his claim could 
have succeeded only if he proved that the investigation would have produced evidence that 
was reasonably likely to have affected the outcome of his trial or appeal. See, e.g., Taylor, 
947 P.2d at 687 (Taylor failed to prove prejudice because he did not offer the mitigating 
evidence that Taylor claimed his counsel was ineffective for overlooking), cert, denied, 525 
U.S. 833 (1998)). He proffered to the post-conviction court no such evidence. For this 
reason alone his "approximately four pages worth of efforts" were insufficient to withstand 
summary judgment. 
Kell next argues that the post-conviction court should have allowed him to re-raise 
9For example, Kell cited no controlling authority establishing that it would have 
been unconstitutional to try him in the CUCF courtroom unless it had certain "regalia," 
had a certain standard of furnishings, or were wheelchair accessible. 
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the claims that he lost on direct appeal because they alleged constitutional defects in his 
conviction and sentence, and because he alleged that counsel were ineffective. For support, 
he cites to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104. Appellant's Brief at 14. It appears that Kell 
intends to argue that section 104 exempts certain kinds of claims from the procedural bar 
provisions. 
In fact, section 104 makes clear that the procedural-bar provisions limit the 
availability of all post-conviction relief. Section 104 lists the kinds of claims that may justify 
post-conviction relief, including that a conviction or sentence violates the Utah or United 
States constitutions, or that counsel was ineffective. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-104(1) (West 
2004). However, it reads that relief is available "[u]nless precluded by Section 78-35a-106." 
Section 106 is the procedural bar provision. Thus, section 104 makes Kell's claims subject 
to, rather than exempt from, the procedural bar provisions. 
Finally, Kell contends that the post-conviction court should not have dismissed as 
procedurally barred his post-conviction challenge to holding the trial at the CUCF courtroom 
because a post-appeal Oregon Supreme Court case supports the claim. Appellant's Brief at 
14. Kell did not make this argument to the post-conviction court. Therefore, he may succeed 
on appeal only if he can establish that the post-conviction court plainly erred by not allowing 
him to proceed to the claims' merits. To meet that burden, Kell must establish that Utah law 
clearly required the post-conviction court to excuse the raised-and-lost procedural bar and 
allow Kell to re-raise his claim in light of a case decided by a sister state's supreme court. 
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See, e.g., State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106 1J32, 61 P.3d 1019 (this Court will review arguments 
raised for the first time on appeal only for plain error); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403-
405 (Utah 1994) (same), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). 
Kell has not acknowledged his failure to preserve the argument or argued plain error. 
By itself, that failure defeats his claim. See State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 <[ffl 46-48, 106 
P.3d 734. 
Alternatively, Kell cannot establish plain error. The PCRA anticipates post-
conviction relief only for retroactive new rules of law pronounced by the United States 
Supreme Court, this Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-104(2) 
(West 2004). Kell cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, that would allow him 
to re-argue in post-conviction review a claim that he lost on direct appeal based on non-
controlling authority from a sister-state's supreme court. 
The post-conviction court correctly dismissed as procedurally barred all of the claims 
that Kell raised and lost on direct appeal. 
III. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON KELL'S CLAIM THAT HIS 
APPELLATE COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE CHALLENGED THE 
DEATH-QUALIFICATION PROCESS OR THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINITIONS10 
Kell asked for post-conviction relief because the trial court death-qualified the jury, 
which he claimed led to a more conviction-prone jury (KIIR259). He also claimed that the 
10This point responds to Kell's point II. 
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trial court's reasonable doubt definitions "did not provide sufficient guidance to the burden 
of proof to the jurors" (KIIR265). The post-conviction court ruled that these claims were 
procedurally barred because Kell could have, but did not raise them on direct appeal and had 
not shown that the failure to raise them resulted from appellate counsel's ineffective 
assistance (KIIR610-11). On appeal, Kell does not challenge the post-conviction court's 
ruling that the claims were procedurally barred, only its ruling on Kell had not raised a fact 
issue on the ineffective-assistance exception. The post-conviction court's ruling was correct. 
In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Kell would have 
had to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim that probably would have 
succeeded. See, e.g., Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 ^ 48. However, Kell's appellate counsel was 
obligated to identify and apply only existing law. See, e.g., id. at f^ 24. 
Kell's own admissions to the post-conviction court defeated his claim that appellate 
counsel should have argued that death-qualifying the jury required reversal. Kell admitted 
that his appellate counsel had no authority available to him that would have supported a 
challenge to the death-qualification process. (KIIR470). To the contrary, existing law 
foreclosed that claim.11 Kell had a right to counsel who would find and apply existing law, 
uSee, e.g, Lockhartv. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167-84 (1986) (although questioning 
the validity of studies offered to demonstrate that death-qualified juries are more 
conviction-prone, the Supreme Court nevertheless assumed the studies demonstrated that 
proposition, but still found that death qualifying juries did not violate McCree's Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1253 (Utah 1988) 
(relying on McCree, the Utah Supreme Court perfunctorily rejected Lafferty's argument 
that death-qualifying the jury resulted in a conviction-prone jury), habeas corpus granted 
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not to counsel who would make arguments foreclosed by existing law. See Lqfferty, 2007 
UT 73 If 24 (affirming summary judgment on Lafferty's claim that his appellate counsel 
should have challenged the death-qualification process because controlling United States 
Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court authority had held that death-qualifying a jury was 
not unconstitutional). 
The post-conviction court also correctly rejected KelPs claim that his appellate 
counsel should have challenged the reasonable doubt definitions that the trial court gave.12 
Kell identified for the post-conviction no specific defect in either instruction that he believed 
appellate counsel should have argued. Kell cited to the post-conviction court no authority 
available to appellate counsel that should have alerted him to any unidentified defect in either 
instruction or that would have supported an appellate challenge. See Taylor v. Warden, 905 
P.2d 277, 285 (Utah ) (Taylor failed to prove ineffective-assistance based on counsel's 
failure to file pre-trial motions where he failed to identify "what they would have been based 
on or how he could have prevailed"). Kell's bare allegation that counsel had a constitutional 
obligation to raise the argument was insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See 
on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
12At the guilt phase, the trial court instructed the jury that reasonable doubt meant a 
doubt "based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation, supposition, 
emotion or sympathy. It must be reasonable and not merely imaginary. It is such as 
would be retained by reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration 
of all the evidence" (KIR2295, addendum D). At the penalty phase, the trial court 
defined reasonable doubt as "doubt. . . based on reason and common sense and not on 
speculation or imagination. . . . [It] must satisfy the mind and convince those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon such proof (KIR2356, addendum E). 
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Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 ffif 48-51. 
For the first time in this appeal, Kell argues that the trial court's reasonable doubt 
definitions mirrored that which this Court purportedly found to be "reversible error" in 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33. Appellant's Brief at 23. However, Kell cannot succeed on this 
argument unless he establishes that the post-conviction court should have concluded on its 
own that Reyes required appellate counsel to raise a claim that probably would have 
succeeded. See, e.g., Kell, 2002 UT 106 ^32; Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403-405. See also 
Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 f^ 48. Kell has not acknowledged his failure to preserve the argument 
or argued plain error. That failure alone defeats his claim. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 ^[46-48. 
In any event, Reyes could not have alerted the post-conviction court to any obvious 
ineffective assistance. This Court decided Reyes approximately seven years after the trial 
court instructed the jury and over three years after Keifs direct appeal concluded. Thus, 
Reyes does not establish that appellate counsel plainly failed to "identify and apply existing 
law." Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 f 24.13 
13Even if Reyes were relevant, it would not have shown that counsel was 
ineffective. The reasonable doubt definition under review in Reyes closely tracked the 
definitions given in this case. Compare Reyes, 2005 UT 33 f^ 2, with KIR2295 and 2356. 
However, this Court held that the Reyes reasonable definition did not constitute reversible 
error. Id. at \ 34. Reyes stands for the proposition opposite that for which Kell cites it. 
See also State v. Austin, 2007 UT 55 ^ 7, 165 P-3d 1191. 
Also for the first time on appeal, Kell argues that, "although [the Reyes] instruction 
has been found to pass Constitutional scrutiny by this Court under Federal Constitutional 
analysis {See Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739 (2007)) it was and is still error under State 
Constitutional grounds." Appellant's Brief at 23. Kell cites no case that the post-
conviction court should have recognized was available to appellate counsel that would 
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Kell's other arguments demonstrate no error in the post-conviction court's rejection 
of these two claims. Kell argues that the post-conviction court's ruling "begs the question 
as to if appellate counsel did not raise [the omitted claims], who would?" Appellant's Brief 
at 18. He contends that "this is the very kernel of ineffective assistance of counsel: had prior 
counsel actually provided effective assistance, then these claims would have been brought 
on direct appeal." Id. (emphasis in original). 
This Court already has rejected this identical "very kernel" argument, holding that it 
"misconstrue[s] the premise of [the Court's] ineffective assistance of counsel standard. 
Appellate counsel is not obligated to raise '"every nonfrivolous issue on appeal... [and may] 
' winnow out' weaker claims in order to focus effectively on those more likely to prevail.'" 
Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 If 49 (quoting Carter, 2001 UT 96 If 48 (citation omitted). See also 
Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53 f^ 24 (appellate counsel is not obligated to raise every 
nonfrivolous claim). 
Kell also asserts that 1) if appellate counsel's failure to raise the two claims "was 
knowing and intentional, as an appeal strategy, it was woefully below a recognized standard 
have demonstrated that a reasonable doubt definition similar to the one that this Court 
affirmed in Reyes violated some unidentified provision of the Utah Constitution. The 
unpreserved claim therefore fails. Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 \ 24. See also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9)(requiring parties to provide supporting contentions and reasons for their 
arguments and to include the grounds for reviewing unpreserved issues); State v. Honie, 
2002 UT 4 ^61 n.7, 57 P.3d 977 (declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where 
Honie had not demonstrated in "any meaningful fashion" why the Court should apply 
cited constitutional provisions to create the proposed rule), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863 
(2002). 
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of competence required for capital offense appellate work"; and 2) "the fact that prior 
counsel did not bring these claims on direct appeal demonstrates a lack of competence and 
ineffective assistance." Appellant's Brief at 18. However, Kell includes no analysis or 
authority to support these conclusions. Rather, he merely asserts conclusions that incorporate 
the legal standard for deficient performance. Such a bare recitation does not establish that 
the post-conviction court erroneously rejected his ineffective-assistance claim. See, e.g., 
Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 f^ 50 ("[t]he mere repetition of the Strickland standard does not create 
the demonstrable reality of ineffective assistance necessary to overturn a conviction"); 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) (same). 
Similarly, Kell never attempts to demonstrate prejudice. He argues only that appellate 
counsel's failure to raise challenges to the death qualification process and the jury 
instructions defining reasonable doubt prejudiced him "because these claims were never 
heard by this Court." Appellant's Brief at 18. However, in order to establish the requisite 
prejudice, Kell would have had to prove that the omitted appellate claims likely would have 
succeeded. Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 Tj 51. Merely showing that this Court never heard a claim 
because appellate counsel did not raise it will not suffice. Id. 
The post-conviction court correctly ruled that Kell's ineffective-assistance claims 
failed as a matter of law.14 
14As to counsel's failure to challenge the death-qualification process, the Court 
may affirm on the alternative basis that Kell's amended petition did not include an 
ineffective-assistance claim based on that failure (KIIR259). See, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 
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IV. KELL'S TRIAL COUNSEL WERE NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR 
FAILING TO SEEK INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF AN ISSUE 
THAT THEY LATER LOST ON PLENARY APPEAL15 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel should have sought interlocutory review of the trial 
court's decision to try him in the CUCF courtroom (KIIR267). The State moved for 
summary judgment on the claim. Kell did not oppose the motion, and the post-conviction 
court accordingly granted it (KIIR612). 
The post-conviction court's disposition was correct. The State's summary judgment 
motion obligated Kell to make his "best showing" on his claim that the Sixth Amendment 
required trial counsel to seek interlocutory review of the order to try him at CUCF. See 
Brandt, 353 P.2d at 462. It shifted to Kell "the burden . . . to present evidence that is 
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact" on his claim. Waddoups v. 
2002 UT 58 1(10, 52 P.3d 1158 (an appellate court may affirm on any '"legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record'") (citation omitted). After the post-conviction court ruled 
on Kell's amended petition, this Court issued its decision in Lafferty. Like Kell, Lafferty 
claimed that death-qualifying the jury violated his constitutional rights. Lafferty, 2007 
UT 73 Tf 23. Also like Kell, Lafferty's petition included no separate ineffective-assistance 
claim related the death qualification process. Id. Instead, Lafferty did not raise the 
ineffective-assistance issue until the State moved for summary judgment on the claim 
because it was procedurally barred. Id, 
This Court disapproved of Lafferty's belated reliance on an ineffective-assistance 
argument, holding, "[W]e also object to the way [the ineffective assistance] argument was 
raised . . . . Raising an issue for the first time in a memorandum opposing summary 
judgment without showing good cause violates the pleading requirements for post-
conviction petitions, Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c)." Id. 
Like Lafferty, Kell did not raise in his amended petition an ineffective-assistance 
claim related to the death-qualification process. The Court may affirm the denial of post-
conviction relief on that alternative basis. 
15This point responds to Kell's point III. 
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Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69 131, 54 P.3d 1054, 
Kell made no showing at all. Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly ruled that 
Kell's failure to oppose summary judgment on this claim required the court to grant it. Kell's 
failure to oppose summary judgment on this claim waived any appellate challenge to the 
post-conviction court's decision to grant it. See Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 
Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). 
The Court may affirm on an alternative ground apparent from the record. See, e.g., 
Bailey, 2002 UT 58 f^lO. Specifically, the claim was patently frivolous. Appellate counsel 
challenged the decision to try Kell at the CUCF courtroom on plenary, post-judgment review. 
This Court rejected his challenge on the merits. Kell, 2002 UT ^[11-16. If counsel had 
asked the Court to review the issue sooner and the Court had granted that request, Kell only 
would have lost sooner rather than later. See Carter, 2001 UT 96 f^ 48 ("failure to raise an 
issue that is without merit 'does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel'") (citation omitted). 
Kell's ineffective-assistance claim fails on multiple grounds. 
V. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON KELL'S REMAINING CLAIMS 
In his point IV, Kell argues that the post-conviction court erroneously shifted the 
summary judgment burden to him. He then argues that the court erroneously granted 
summary judgment on several of his ineffective-assistance claims. Appellant's Brief at 19-
28. 
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As detailed in the following subsections, the post-conviction court correctly assigned 
to the State and Kell their respective burdens triggered by the State's summary judgment 
motion and correctly granted summary judgment on KelFs claims. 
A. The post-conviction court correctly assigned to the State and to Kell their 
respective burdens under the law governing summary judgment practice. 
When a party moves for summary judgment and meets its initial burden of supporting 
the summary judgment motion with evidence, "the burden . . . shiftfs] to [the nonmoving 
party] to present evidence [by affidavit or as otherwise permitted by Utah R. Civ. P. 56] that 
is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." Waddoups, 2002 UT 69^31 
(citations omitted). The nonmoving party may not rely on "'mere allegations or denials'" or 
"conclusory assertions" that a genuine, material fact issue exists. Id. See also Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(e) (when a summary judgment motion is supported by evidence, the nonmoving party 
"may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings"). Further, the nonmoving 
party must make his "best showing" in support of his claims because summary judgment 
serves the "salutary purpose" of "eliminat[ing] the time, trouble and expense of a trial when, 
upon the best showing the [petitioner] can make, he would not be entitled to a judgment." 
Brandt, 353 P.2d at 462 (Utah 1960). The post-conviction court correctly recognized and 
applied these burdens (KIIR611). 
The State met its initial burden by supporting each of its factual assertions with 
citations to the underlying criminal record and providing legal authority to establish that the 
record facts coupled with Kell's allegations failed as a matter of law to state a claim for post-
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conviction relief. Kell has not argued otherwise. 
Kell insists, however, that the post-conviction court erroneously shifted the summary 
judgment burden to him. Appellant's Brief at 21-22. He argues that "[w]hen the moving 
party for summary judgment alleges that an act happened, and the non-moving party indicates 
that the act did not happen, the court is left with a 'did not-did so' scenario. Oftentimes, no 
evidence exists without an evidentiary hearing, that can show that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact except for a non-moving party's insistence that the act did or did not occur." 
Id. at 22. Thus, Kell argues that mere allegations and denials will suffice to withstand a 
summary judgment motion, and that, as the non-moving party, he was entitled to wait until 
an evidentiary hearing to present evidence that may demonstrate a genuine, material fact 
issue. 
Kell misstates the law. Under the controlling law cited above, all of which Kell 
ignores, Kell bore the burden to rebut the State's motion with an evidentiary proffer. He was 
not entitled to rest on his mere denials, as he insists here and insisted below. Waddoups, 
2002 UT 69 H 31; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Further, Kell had to proffer the evidence that he would present and demonstrate with 
appropriate analysis and citation to authority why, if proven and believed, that evidence 
would entitle him to post-conviction relief. See Brandt, 3 53 P.2d at 462. He was not entitled 
to skip to an evidentiary hearing and hope that the evidence to support his claims would 
materialize at that time. 
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Because Kell utterly failed to fulfill his burdens, the post-conviction court properly 
granted summary judgment against him. 
B. The post-conviction court correctly ruled that Kell established no genuine 
material fact issue and that all of his ineffective-assistance claims failed as a 
matter of law. 
1. KelPs ineffective assistance claims were run of the mill claims that required him 
to prove both Strickland elements. 
Kell argues that his allegations establish "per se" deficient performance and "per se" 
prejudice. Appellant's Brief at 22. Kell offers no explanation of what he means. To the 
extent that he intends his use of "per se" to invite the Court to presume either or both of the 
Strickland elements, the governing case law, none of which Kell cites, defeats him. 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), recognized that there are circumstances 
where both elements of ineffective assistance may be presumed. The Supreme Court 
identified Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), as an example of such a case. In Powell, 
the trial court appointed an out-of-state attorney on the day of trial to represent Powell. To 
resolve counsel's request for time to prepare the case and familiarize himself with local 
procedure, the trial court concluded that out-of-state counsel could rely on whatever help the 
local bar could provide. The Supreme Court found the likelihood that counsel could perform 
effectively under those circumstance so remote that it presumed a denial of the effective 
assistance of counsel without examining counsel's actual trial performance. Cronic, 466 
U.S. at 658-62. 
Kell's counsel were appointed well in advance of trial, filed multiple pre-trial motions, 
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engaged in extensive pre-trial motion practice, examined witnesses at the preliminary 
hearing, questioned prospective jurors, and presented extensive guilt and penalty phase 
evidence.16 The situation under which the Cronic court posited that both Stricklandelements 
may be presumed bears no resemblance to KelPs situation. 
Cronic also recognized an exception to proving Strickland prejudice where counsel 
"entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Cronic, 
466 U.S. at 659. However, the failure must be "entire[];" the Cronic exception does not 
apply for failing to oppose the prosecution at specific points in the proceedings. Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-97 (2002). Kell challenges counsel's performance on discrete 
issues. He has not and cannot demonstrate that his counsel "entirely" failed to represent him. 
16Pre-trial motions, including motions to change venue, declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional, sever, exclude the videotape, see, e.g., KIR15-17; 24-30; 39-40; 43-46; 
56-57; 94-116; 196-97; 201-08; 227-29; 262-270; 280-81; 286-87; 350-56; 375-77; 391-
96; 413-18; 421-24; 444-45; 464-74; 491-99; 504-10; 537-48; 575-91; 592-612; 617-19; 
624-28; 724-25; 897-99; 900-12; 918-19; 920-31; 932-43; 935-36; 937-49; 950-57; 958-
64; 965-83; 984-992; 993-1021; 1022-31; 1032-39; 1040-42; 1043-45; 1316-45; 1364-74; 
1375; 1376-1406; 1439-49; 1507-10; 1511-13; 1514-16; 1517-44; 1555-77; 1595-96; 
1603-04; 1639-45; 1675-77; 1678-84; 1686-93; 1735-44; 1745-54; 1755-56; 1763-80; 
1781-98; 1799-1812; 1821-23; 1843-45; 1846-56; 1859-62; 1863-66; 1867-1871; 1890-
1932; 1933-1948; 1954-55; 2005-14; 2071-80; 2389-2392; 2392-94; 2403-05; 2456-57; 
and 2484-85. August 12, 1994, hearing to appoint counsel, T7520-65. Two day 
preliminary hearing, T2664-2920; 2923-3086. Hearings on various pre-trial motions, see, 
e.g., T5759-5800; 5802-5872; 5918-5927; 7650-7704; 7811-7926; 7930-7960; 7962-
8107, 8108-8291; 8293-8302; 8307-8483; 8485-8596; 5874-5896; 8663-8705; 8707-
8784; 8793-8859; and 8868-9005. Jury voir dire, see generally, II through VI. Guilt 
phase opening statement, VII4560-71; guilt phase defense case 1X4919-5006, X5013-86; 
guilt phase closing, XII5452-56; penalty phase defense case IV5637-80; and penalty 
phase defense closing, IV5696-5718. In addition, defense counsel cross-examined the 
State's witnesses at both the guilt and penalty phases. 
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Kell's claims were run of the mill ineffective-assistance claims. As detailed in point 
II, Kell therefore had the burden of proving both deficient performance and prejudice. See 
point II and cited cases. As detailed in the following subsections, the post-conviction court 
correctly ruled that he raised no genuine material fact issue on any of his ineffective-
assistance claims. 
2. Kell has not argued or shown that the post-conviction court plainly erred by 
rejecting his claim that trial counsel should have challenged the instructions 
defining reasonable doubt. 
Kell also claimed that his trial counsel should have challenged the trial court's 
reasonable doubt definitions (KIIR265). The post-conviction court granted summary 
judgment because Kell did not "describe how the reasonable doubt instruction was 
inadequate" (KIIR614). 
That ruling was correct. Kell failed to make his "best showing" when he relied on 
nothing more than his bare allegation the trial court misdefmed reasonable doubt. Further, 
as explained in point III, Kell did not make to the post-conviction court the arguments he 
raises here, and his arguments rely solely on law unavailable to his trial counsel, and on a 
misstatement of the cited law at that. 
3. The post-conviction court correctly rejected Kell's claim that the Sixth 
Amendment required his counsel to admit the entire "Dear Luther" letter. 
The "Dear Luther" letter was a letter that Kell wrote to a Nevada inmate sometime 
between the Payne and Blackmon fights, and the day Kell murdered Blackmon (KIIR365-69, 
addendum F; 402-405, addendum G, and 407-10, addendum H). The State offered a redacted 
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version of the letter to show that Kell murdered Blackmon out of racial hatred and in 
retaliation for Blackmon's "cheap shot" against Payne (113332-52; VIII4757-62). Trial 
counsel moved to exclude the entire letter (KIR1890-1926). The trial court admitted the 
redacted version (VIII4762, 4831). 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel should have sought to admit the unredacted letter 
(KIIR265-66). That claim is frivolous, and the post-conviction court correctly denied it 
(KIIR614-15). 
The letter was redacted for Kell's benefit. As redacted, the letter informed the jury 
of Kell's racial and revenge motives specific to Blackmon and to the Blackmon murder 
(KIIR364-71). The complete letter would have been damning to Kell. Among other things, 
it would have told the jury determining Kell's guilt of his general racism as evinced by his 
consistent use of "nigger" or "nig," his disgust for white inmates who did not share his racist 
views, his attempts to spread his racism, and his envy of another inmate's photograph 
depicting a white inmate eating a sandwich near an African-American inmate's dead body. 
The jury would have read of Kell's satisfaction about potential security flaws in his housing 
unit, read his boasts of assaulting a S.W.A.T. team member, and read his proclamation of the 
need for reprisal against an inmate "throwing" another inmate's name (KIIR402-405, 407-
10). 
Rather than help Kell, this information would have bolstered the State's racial 
motivation theory and would have informed the jury aboutKell's general racism, criminality, 
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and threat to prison security. Counsel chose the better course by attempting to keep the letter 
out entirely rather than moving to admit the entire letter.17 
4. The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelPs bare allegation that trial 
counsel conducted an inadequate pre-trial investigation. 
Kell claimed that his counsel "failed to conduct effective and complete pretrial 
investigation and was not able to devote the necessary time to Kell's case due to the rigorous 
demand's [sic] of trial counsel's practice" (KIIR266). The post-conviction court granted 
summary judgment because Kell gave no "specific examples of deficiencies during the 
pretrial investigation" and did not "indicate how these failings prejudiced him" (KIIR615-
16). That ruling was correct. 
Kell had the ultimate burden of proving "specific" acts or omissions that fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Further, 
Kell had the burden of proving the specific evidence that trial counsel would have discovered 
with the unidentified additional investigation, see Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687, and that, if the 
jury had heard the additional unidentified evidence, there would have been a reasonable 
17Kell also concludes that counsel failed to comply with ABA Guideline 
11.5.1(B)12. Even if true, a mere failure to comply with the ABA Guidelines does not 
demonstrate deficient performance. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81 f90, 150 P.3d 480. 
See also Lajferty, 2007 UT 73 \ 34 (the ABA Guidelines "do not. . . establish a rigid 
checklist or set of rules that counsel must satisfy in order to provide effective 
representation"). In any event, the cited ABA Guideline suggests only that capital 
defense counsel should seek to litigate evidentiary issues through pre-trial motions in 
limine. Kell's counsel did so when he moved to exclude the entire letter (KIR1890-
1926). 
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probability of a more favorable result, see Taylor, 2007 UT 12 ^ 56, 156 P.3d 739. Kell 
could not meet his burdens with a mere allegation of ineffective assistance, see Fernandez, 
870 P.2d at 877, and, to withstand summary judgment, he had to make his "best showing" 
on both Strickland elements, Brandt, 353 P.2d at 462. 
Kell did none of this. Kell never identified, let alone proffered, any evidence of the 
specific investigation that he claimed the Sixth Amendment required his counsel to perform. 
He never identified or proffered any proof of the actual evidence that the unidentified 
investigation would have yielded. Kell's "best showing" failed as a matter of law to establish 
that he would have been entitled to post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court 
correctly granted summary judgment on this claim. 
For the first time on appeal, Kell argues that his trial counsel failed "to live up to the 
ABA's standards," and allegedly did not meet the ABA Guidelines qualifications. 
Appellant's Brief at 23. Kell did not make these arguments below and has not argued plain 
error on appeal. The claim fails for that reason alone. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 ^ [46-48. 
In any event, a mere failure to comply with the ABA Guidelines will not demonstrate 
deficient performance. See, e.g., Menzies, 2006 UT 81 [^90. Similarly, any defect in 
counsel's qualifications cannot establish deficient performance. The Stricklandelements of 
an ineffective-assistance claim look to what counsel did or did not do and whether counsel's 
action or inaction adversely affected the outcome; they do not look to counsel's resume. See, 
e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. See also Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 ffif 32-33 (holding that the 
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failure to meet Utah R. Crim. P. 8's qualification requirements "without more .. . does not 
establish deficiency" under Strickland)', Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282 (counsel's failure to meet 
"prevailing norms" of experience will not establish ineffective assistance). 
Alternatively, Kell proffered no evidence below to support the argument. He 
proffered no evidence of what investigation counsel did do, let alone demonstrated that it was 
less than what the ABA Guidelines suggested. He proffered no evidence of counsel's 
reasons for passing over additional investigation, if, in fact, they did so. He proffered no 
evidence of counsel's qualifications. Because he proffered none of this evidence below, he, 
of course, cites no record support for the argument that he first raises on appeal. 
5. The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelPs challenge to counsel's pre-
trial motion practice. 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel inadequately researched and briefed pre-trial 
motions (KIIR267). The post-conviction court granted summary judgment because Kell did 
not specify which motions were inadequately briefed (KIIR618-19). That ruling was correct. 
This Court's precedent dictated that outcome. In Taylor v. Warden, this Court 
rejected Taylor's challenge to his trial counsel's pre-trial motion practice because Taylor did 
not "specify what [the motions] would have been based on," specify "how [Taylor] could 
have prevailed," or "show that if he had prevailed on any given motions, a different outcome 
would have resulted." Taylor, 905 P.2d at 285. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, Ml U.S. 
365, 389 (1986) (to prove Strickland prejudice from counsel's failure to move to suppress 
evidence, Kimmelman had to prove that there would have been a "reasonable probability 
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. . . that the trial judge would have had a reasonable doubt concerning Kimmelman's guilt 
if the [seized evidence] and related testimony had been excluded"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687-88,690 (persons challenging their counsel's representation must point to "specific" acts 
and omissions that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness). 
Kell never 1) identified which pre-trial motions that he claims his counsel 
inadequately briefed and researched; 2) identified any specific deficiency in any pre-trial 
research and briefing; 3) identified what additional and superior research and briefing were 
constitutionally required; 4) presented any authority or analysis to demonstrate that the 
additional research would have made it reasonably likely that the unidentified motions would 
have succeeded; or 5) presented any analysis to demonstrated that, if any unidentified motion 
had succeeded, there would have been a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable trial 
outcome. Controlling authority dictated the judgment against Kell. 
On appeal, Kell argues only that the pre-trial motions are part of the record. 
Therefore, according to Kell, his allegations were "sufficient on their face to show a violation 
of both prongs of Strickland" Appellant's Brief at 24. 
Kell misses the point. Both below and in this Court, Kell merely concludes without 
any analysis or citation to authority that counsel's motion practice violated Strickland. He 
has attempted to shift to the courts the burden of trying to figure out how. The post-
conviction court correctly declined to accept that burden, and, as it has in the past, this Court 
should as well. See, e.g., Honie, 2002 UT 4 ^ 67 ("a reviewing court is not simply a 
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depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research"). 
6. The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelPs claim that his counsel should 
have called additional witnesses or looked for additional impeachment evidence. 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel should have 1) called three inmates who allegedly 
could have rebutted the State's argument that the prison had procedures to address inmate 
threats; 2) called two unidentified black inmates who allegedly could have rebutted the 
"racist claim"; 3) obtained unidentified State's witnesses' "jackets," which allegedly could 
have revealed unidentified potential credibility issues; and 4) requested from the prosecutor 
Kell's unidentified racist statements that unidentified inmates overheard (KIIR267). The 
post-conviction court denied the claim, ruling that Kell proffered no evidence to establish 
prejudice on the first allegation, and that Kell supported the rest of the allegations with 
insufficient facts to withstand summary judgment (KIIR617-18). That ruling was correct. 
At trial, Kell contended that he could not have relied on institutional procedures to 
resolve Blackmon's alleged threat (1X4931-32, 4936-37, 4968; X5130-31, 5182-84, 5198; 
XI4956-57, 4968, 4979-80.) Even assuming that the three witnesses could have supported 
that theory, Kell cannot prove prejudice. Trial counsel presented videotaped depositions 
from two inmates who testified that threats from other inmates had to be taken seriously and 
that reporting inmate threats to prison authorities was not a sufficient remedy (XIV5655-56; 
T5931:3-5, 10-12, 14-17, 19; T5964:3-4, 11-13). The jury did not find this to be sufficient 
justification for killing Blackmon. Proffering more of the same kind of evidence that failed 
to convince the jury in the first place does not raise a material fact issue on counsel's 
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assistance. See James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 557 (10th Cir. 2000) (James failed to prove 
Strickland prejudice by proffering in habeas corpus review additional mitigation evidence 
that was largely cumulative of that which counsel presented at trial); Castro v. Ward, 138 
F.3d 810, 828-29 (10th Cir.) (proffered post conviction evidence from a different mental 
health expert, although more detailed and adding an organic brain damage diagnosis not 
previously provided, was insufficient to demonstrate a due process violation where the 
additional evidence was not different "in kind" from that which the sentencing jury heard), 
cert, denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998). See also Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 \ 31 (Lafferty failed to 
prove ineffective-assistance at the penalty phase where his post-conviction proffer consisted 
of the very evidence that his trial court presented at trial).18 
The post-conviction court also correctly rejected KelFs claims that counsel should 
have called two unidentified black inmates to rebut the "racist claim." Kell never proffered 
evidence of what the two unidentified inmates would have testified to or even identified who 
they were. See, e.g., Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687. At trial, counsel presented testimony from 
inmates that he was not a racist; the testimony did not persuade the jury in his favor. See 
18The Court may affirm on the alternative basis that Kell alleged no facts known to 
trial counsel or of which counsel should have been aware that, if proven, would have 
required counsel to investigate the testimony that he claims the three inmates could have 
provided. He alleged no facts that would have demonstrated that these witness were 
available at the time he was tried. Although he generically states that they could have 
rebutted the State's argument that the prison had procedures to address inmate threats, he 
did not allege what their testimony would have been, demonstrated that it would have 
been so compelling that counsel would have been obligated to call them, or that it would 
have made a more favorable outcome at either phase reasonably probable. 
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James, 211 F.3d at 557; Castro, 138 F.3d at 828-29. Moreover, the redacted "Dear Luther" 
letter demonstrated the racial motive for the murder. The unredacted letter, which Kell 
asserts his counsel should have introduced, overwhelmingly demonstrated his general racism. 
Unidentified testimony from two unidentified black inmates could not have changed the 
evidentiary picture enough to undermine confidence in the outcome. 
Kell also proffered no evidence of what impeachment evidence actually existed in any 
witness's "jacket." He never identified the overheard racist statements that he claims trial 
counsel should have requested from the prosecutor or offer any evidence that his trial counsel 
did not know about them. As stated, counsel attempted to address the issue of KelPs racism; 
it did not change the outcome. 
Finally, for the reasons demonstrated in point I, there was no real issue about Kell's 
guilt or even the appropriate sentence. Presenting cumulative evidence on whether Kell was 
racist and whether he should have reported Blackmon's threat rather than kill Blackmon, or 
unidentified impeachment evidence of unidentified witnesses would not have changed the 
outcome at either phase. 
7. Kell has never demonstrated that statements to prison guards that he would fake 
his remorse tipped the penalty balance against him. 
Kell claimed that his counsel should have cautioned him against confiding in prison 
guards (KIIR267). The claim referred to the prison guards' testimony that Kell faked his 
remorse at the penalty phase. The post-conviction court granted summary judgment because 
Kell had not demonstrated how his statements to the guards prejudiced the penalty outcome 
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(KIIR618-19). 
On appeal, Kell merely concludes that the officers' rebuttal testimony "was 
sufficiently damaging to make the difference between a finding of life without parole and a 
finding for the death penalty . . . . Petitioner feels that if this is not prejudice, than no 
prejudice in the realm of the law can exist." Appellant's Brief at 25. Kell offers no analysis 
of how5 in light of the entire penalty-phase evidentiary picture, the jury likely would have 
spared his life if they had believed his apology. If merely repeating the Strickland standard 
cannot suffice to meet Kell's burden, see, e.g., Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 J^ 50, then merely 
professing his feeling that counsel prejudiced his case also cannot. 
Further, the record defeats Kell's feeling that the officers' testimony prejudiced him. 
Given the planning and viciousness of the attack and Kell's glee after finishing Blackmon 
off, the jury likely would have discredited Kell's remorse even without the officer's 
testimony. The jury likely would have concluded that any genuine remorse that Kell felt 
arose from the possible punishment that he faced, not the acts that justified imposing it. As 
demonstrated in point I, Ihe State presented an overwhelming aggravation case that led to one 
inevitable conclusion: only a death sentence could address Kell's relentless violence.19 
19The Court may affirm on the alternative basis that Kell proffered no analysis or 
facts to demonstrate that his counsel were deficient. See, e.g., Bailey, 2002 UT 58 [^10. 
In essence, Kell claims that his counsel should have cautioned him against making 
statements that may have impaired his chances of bamboozling the jury into believing that 
he was sorry for murdering Blackmon. Kell offered no evidence that he informed his 
counsel that his remorse for murdering Blackmon would be nothing but an Academy 
Award winning performance. He cites nothing else suggesting that counsel should have 
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8. KelPs challenge to counsel's failure to raise a due process challenge based on 
KelPs original transfer to Utah was frivolous. 
Kell claimed that his counsel should have argued that his transfer from Nevada to 
Utah violated due process because it was illegal (KIIR267-68, 486). In his summary 
judgment opposition, Kell explained that counsel should have claimed that the illegal transfer 
"purposely" placed him in a dangerous "kill or be killed" situation (KIIR486). The post-
conviction court granted summary judgment because 1) the claim was tied to the self-defense 
claim that this Court rejected on direct appeal; and 2) Kell had not demonstrated prejudice 
from counsel's failure to raise the claim. (KIIR619-20). 
Kell argues that the post-conviction court erred because "[c]learly, the due process 
claim does not rest only on a self-defense claim but on a prejudice claim that 'but for' the 
transfer, Kell would never have been put in the same facility in the same circumstances with 
Mr. Blackmon." Appellant's Brief at 25. To the extent Kell contends that his counsel could 
have avoided a capital murder conviction or death sentence by arguing that the real cause of 
Blackmon's death was an illegal transfer to Utah, he has never cited any authority available 
to counsel that would have supported such a claim. Further, Kell never has proffered any 
anticipated that he might make such a statement to the prison guards and warned him 
against doing so. Moreover, trial counsel obviously knew that, at the time of his capital 
murder trial, Kell had already spent several years in prison. Kell had threatened a prison 
guard in the Nevada penal system because she had disclosed to her supervisors statements 
that Kell made to her. Kell's prison experience would have given his trial counsel every 
reason to assume that Kell knew better than to treat prison guards as his confidantes. 
Kell's allegations did not overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered 
constitutionally adequate representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690. 
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evidence or legal authority to demonstrate that the transfer was illegal. Therefore, he never 
raised a genuine material fact issue about whether counsel overlooked a claim that would 
have been reasonably likely to avoid his conviction. See, e.g., Kimmelman, All U.S. at 389; 
Taylor, 905 P.2d at 285. 
9. The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelPs claim that his counsel should 
have discovered that the State presented perjured testimony. 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel should have discovered and objected that the State 
allegedly presented perjured testimony from inmate Francisco Colon, who witnessed Kell 
murder Blackmon (XI5307-5316). (KIIR268). The post-conviction court granted summary 
judgment because Kell proffered no specific facts to support the claim (KIIR620). That 
ruling was correct. 
To succeed on a claim that the State presented perjured testimony, Kell's trial counsel 
would have had to show that 1) Colon perjured himself; 2) the State knew that Colon 
perjured himself; and 3) that "'there [was] any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury.'" State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1228 
(Utah 1986)(citation omitted). Kell proffered no evidence that Colon in fact perjured himself 
or that the State knew that he had and failed to disclose it. In fact, Kell never alleged what 
part of Colon's testimony he alleges was false. Further, Kell never explained how, absent 
any unidentified perjured testimony, there would have been "any reasonable likelihood" that 
the jury, who witnessed Kell murder Blackmon via the videotape, would have acquitted him 
capital murder. 
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On appeal, Kell argues only that the post-conviction court should not have granted 
summary judgment because he "alleged that a prosecution witness . . . perjured himself and 
that counsel failed to point out that perjury to discredit the witness." Appellant's Brief at 25. 
Thus, Kell persists that his bare allegations sufficed to withstand the State's motion. For the 
reasons argued in subsection A above, they were not. 
10. The post-conviction court correctly rejected Kell's challenge to his trial counsel's 
jury-selection decisions. 
Kell claimed that his counsel should have challenged for cause five prospective jurors 
that counsel removed with peremptory challenges (KIIR268-70). The post-conviction court 
rejected the claims. Applying the deferential standard that this Court established in State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92, for assessing counsel's jury selection decisions, the 
post-conviction court concluded that Kell had established no genuine fact issue on the 
Strickland deficient performance element. The court also concluded that Kell had not 
produced facts showing prejudice. (KIIR620-22.) 
On appeal, Kell challenges only the post-conviction court's prejudice determination. 
However, he had to prove both Strickland elements in order to succeed on the claim. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690, 695. His failure even to argue any error in the post-
conviction court's rejection of his deficiency argument independently requires affirming the 
judgment against him on this claim. 
Alternatively, Kell has demonstrated no error in the post-conviction court's ruling that 
he made an insufficient proffer on the Strickland prejudice element. Kell states only that he 
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"would argue that a biased juror is, per se, prejudice . . . ." Appellant's Brief at 25-26. 
However, trial counsel removed with peremptory challenges all of the prospective jurors that 
Kell claims were biased; therefore, his jury included no biased juror. 
11. The post-conviction court properly rejected Kell's claim that trial counsel should 
have objected that unidentified portions of the State's opening statements were 
argumentative. 
Kell claimed thai his trial counsel should have objected to unidentified portions of the 
State's opening statements at the guilt and penalty phases because they allegedly were 
"argumentative" (KIIR270-71, 488-89). The post-conviction court granted the State's 
summary judgment motion because Kell failed to identify the allegedly argumentative 
statements or show how an objection would have affected the trial outcome (KIIR622). 
On appeal, Kell argues only that "[t]he transcripts are part of the record and no further 
production of specific evidence is necessary when the record is part of what is to be 
considered in summary judgment." Appellant's Brief at 26. Again, Kell misses the point. 
The post-conviction court granted summary judgment not because Kell failed to proffer 
additional evidence, but because Kell failed to point to the objectionable material that was 
in the record. The post-conviction court was not obligated to read the prosecutor's opening 
statements and try to intuit what Kell believed was sufficiently argumentative to necessitate 
an objection or analyze for him whether any argumentative statement probably affected the 
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guilt or penalty phase outcomes. Cf, e.g., Honie, 2002 UT4 \6l n.7. ° 
12. The post-conviction court correctly rejected Kell's claim that his counsel gave 
him inadequate advice about whether to testify at the guilt phase. 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective because they allegedly failed to 
give him sufficient advice about whether to testify in the guilt phase (KIIR270). The post-
conviction court granted summary judgment on this claim because Kell failed to "provide[] 
specific facts" to support it (KIIR623). 
The post-conviction court's ruling was correct. Keifs theory at the guilt phase was 
that he had to kill Blackmon before Blackmon killed him, and he so testified. Kell further 
testified that he believed, based on his experiences in prison and his awareness of 
Blackmon's reputation, that Blackmon posed a real threat. (X5050-5132.) Kell proffered 
to the post-conviction court no other means available to counsel to present this evidence to 
the jury, and only Kell could provide direct evidence of his motive for the video-taped 
murder. 
On appeal, Kell argues only that "[t]he Petition is a statement from the Petitioner on 
his behalf. His allegation is a specific fact that he indicated to [post-conviction] counsel who 
20The State does not agree that Kell necessarily could rely solely on the record of 
the argument. Even if State's counsel's made an objectionable statement, counsel may 
have had a legitimate reason not to object. Without evidence of why counsel chose not to 
object, Kell cannot overcome the "strong presumption" that counsel rendered 
constitutionally sufficient assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Cf. also Carter, 
2001 UT 96 TJ41 (counsel's juror selection decisions are presumed to be constitutionally 
sufficient even though they may appear to be counterintuitive on the cold record). 
Counsel proffered no evidence on counsel's reasons for not objecting. 
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was drafting the Petition." Appellant's Brief at 26. In essence, Kell contends that he was 
allowed to rest on the unsworn allegations in his Amended Petition to oppose summary 
judgment. As demonstrated in subsection A, he was not. 
Even if Kelt's unsworn allegations in the Amended Petition could stand in for a sworn 
statement, they were insufficient as a matter of law to withstand summary judgment. The 
allegations merely concluded that his counsel "failed to adequately advise him" about 
testifying at the guilt phase. A party opposing summary judgment may not rely on 
"conclusory statements." Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 ^ } 31 (party opposing summary judgment 
may not rely on "conclusory assertions"). Kell's bare allegation did not overcome the 
"strong presumption" that counsel gave Kell adequate advice about testifying, especially 
given that only Kell could give direct evidence in support of his defense theory. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
13. The post-conviction court correctly rejected Kell's claim that his counsel should 
have ensured that all bench conferences were recorded. 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did not insist on 
recording every bench conference, "even though this was a death penalty case" (KIIR270). 
The post-conviction court corrected rejected this claim because Kell proffered no evidence 
of how recording bench conferences "would have produced a different outcome" for Kell 
(KIIR623). 
The post-conviction court's ruling was correct. Kell had to prove that any decision 
by counsel not to have a bench conference recorded affected the outcome of his trial or 
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appeal. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; Carter, 2001 UT 96 \ 48. He proffered no 
evidence that any unrecorded bench conference had any effect on the outcome of either trial 
phase or the direct appeal. 
On appeal, Kell contends only that counsel's failure to insist on recording all bench 
conferences "is, per se, prejudicial since there is no possibility of finding out what was said 
at the bench conferences in any reliable fashion." Appellant's Brief at 27. Kell did not argue 
per se prejudice below and has not argued plain error on appeal. The Court should affirm 
on that basis alone. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7 ^ [46-48. 
Kell also cites no authority that should have made it plain to the post-conviction court 
that it had to presume prejudice from counsel's failure to insist on recording every bench 
conferences.21 Further, his Court's rules undercut Keifs only rationale for presuming 
prejudice: that failing to record the conferences precludes "finding out what was said . . . in 
any reliable fashion." Appellant's Brief at 27. Utah R. App. P. 11(g) prescribes a method 
to recreate unrecorded proceedings. If the parties cannot stipulate to what happened, the trial 
court resolves the differences. Kell has not attempted to recreate any unrecorded conference, 
has not identified anything that occurred at any unrecorded conference, and offers no analysis 
of how any unidentified argument or unidentified ruling at any unidentified conference 
affected the outcome at either the guilt or penalty phase. Indeed, presuming prejudice would 
As detailed subsection Bl, the presumed prejudice exception generally applies to 
circumstances that do not exist in this case. 
-51-
award Kell a new trial for a videotaped murder committed while he was serving a life-
without-parole-sentence merely because counsel did not insist on recording conferences that 
may have concerned nothing more momentous than the most propitious time to take a lunch 
or bathroom break. 
Kell also argues that failing to ask to record all bench conferences is per se below 
Strickland standards and the ABA Guidelines. Strickland says nothing about the failure to 
ask to record all bench conferences. The ABA Guidelines are not determinative on what the 
Sixth Amendment requires of counsel. Menzies, 2006 UT 81 [^90. Further, Kell cites 
nothing in the Guidelines that require counsel to ask to have all conferences recorded. The 
Guidelines admonish that counsel "should take steps where appropriate to preserve, on all 
applicable state and Federal grounds, any question for review." 1989 ABA Guidelines 11.7.3 
(emphasis added). Kell fails even to argue that any unrecorded conferences dealt with a 
"question for review" that otherwise did not appear in the record. 
14. The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelFs challenge to counsel's 
decision not to explain KelPs position in his penalty-phase opening statement. 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective because they "did not make an 
opening statement [at the penalty phase] informing the jury of Kell's position" (KIIR271). 
The post-conviction court ruled that Kell had not shown that the penalty phase "probably 
would have been different" if counsel had made an opening statement (KIIR624). 
Kell argues in this appeal only that the post-conviction court should not have granted 
summary judgment on this claim because the State did not ask for it. Appellant's Brief at 27. 
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In fact, the State's reply memorandum stated, "[T]he State requests that the Court grant 
summary judgment on and dismiss with prejudice all of Kell's claims" (KIIR510). 
It is true that the State overlooked the claim in its memoranda, but the State's intent 
to include all claims was clear. Kell cites no authority for the proposition that the State's 
oversight necessitates reversing the post-conviction court's order. Rather, this Court has 
"approve[d] of the practice of affirming a lower court on alternative, [even] unbriefed 
grounds." State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65 ^19, 147 P.3d 448. The Court should affirm 
because the claim was frivolous; therefore, reversing and remanding for briefing and another 
ruling in the post-conviction court would not change the outcome. 
Kell complained that his counsel should have made a penalty-phase opening statement 
to explain Kell's position. However, an opening statement was not the appropriate place to 
explain Kell's position. "The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what 
counsel intends to prove in his [or her] own case in chief by way of providing the jury an 
overview of, and general familiarity with, the facts the party intends to prove. It is generally 
accepted that an opening statement should not be argumentative.'" State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, 
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Counsel made a penalty-phase closing argument in which he explained Kell's position 
about why the jury should not sentence Kell to death (XIII5711-16; XIV5718-23). Thus, 
counsel explained Kell's position at the appropriate time. Kell's claim that the Sixth 
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Amendment required counsel to explain his position at an inappropriate time was frivolous, 
and this Court should affirm the post-conviction court's sua sponte rejection of it. 
15, The post-conviction court correctly concluded that this Court's direct-appeal 
holding that the victim-impact evidence did not affect the penalty-phase outcome 
foreclosed Kell's claim that counsel should have objected to admitting it. 
Kell claimed that his trial counsel failed to object to "highly prejudicial victim impact 
testimony" (KIIR271 ).22 The post-conviction court granted summary judgment on this claim, 
concluding in part that Kell could not prove prejudice because this Court already ruled on 
direct appeal that it could see '"nopossibility'" that the victim impact evidence affected the 
outcome. (KIIR625 n.4 (emphasis in post-conviction court's order)). 
That ruling was correct. On direct appeal, this Court ruled that it could "see no 
possibility that the jury's [penalty-phase] verdict would have been different" if the trial court 
had excluded the victim impact evidence. Kell, 2002 UT 106 ^ j 54. That holding foreclosed 
the post-conviction court from finding Strickland prejudice: ^'reasonable probability" of a 
more favorable outcome if counsel had objected to admitting and the trial court had excluded 
the victim-impact evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.23 
22To the extent that Kell claimed his counsel wholly failed to challenge the 
admission of victim-impact evidence, he misstates the facts. Kell challenged the 
admissibility of victim-impact evidence both at trial (KIR836, 839, 1040; 18010, 8968-84) 
and on appeal, Kell, 2002 UT 106 ffif 52-54. Counsel lost. 
23In this appeal, Kell persists that "without having testimony of the family and the 
jury hearing the family's statements of loss and mourning, the jury may well have elected 
to grant the Petitioner life without parole as opposed to the death penalty." Appellant's 
Brief at 27. As demonstrated, this Court already reached the contrary conclusion on 
Kell's direct appeal. Kell, 2002 UT 106 ^ } 54. Further, speculating about what the jury 
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16. The post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment on KelPs claim 
that his counsel called unspecified witnesses who gave unspecified testimony that 
Kell now considers aggravating. 
Kell claimed that his counsel called witnesses at the penalty phase "who gave 
aggravation evidence rather than mitigation evidence" (KIIR271). The post-conviction court 
granted summary judgment because Kell never identified "th[e] witnesses nor the parts of 
their testimony that were aggravating" (KIIR625-26). 
Kell has demonstrated no error in that determination. He argues only that the 
testimony was part of the record. Appellant's Brief at 27. Yet again, Kell misses the point. 
The post-conviction court did not bear the burden of scouring the record and trying to intuit 
which testimony Kell now contends was more aggravating than mitigating. See Honie, 2002 
UT 4 f 67. Rather, Kell bore the burden of identifying the aggravating testimony, the 
authority or reasoning that should have led counsel to conclude not to present it, and how the 
testimony led to a death sentence where the jury otherwise would have opted for life. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690, 694. He failed to do so even in his summary judgment 
opposition. Based on that failure, the post-conviction court correctly concluded that Kell 
could not support the claim. See Brandt, 353 P.2d at 462 (summary judgment motion 
requires the non-moving party to make his "best showing" in support of his claims). 
"may well have elected" to do is irrelevant. Kell had to demonstrate that trial counsel 
could have kept the victim-impact evidence out, and that, without it, there would have 
been a reasonable probability that the jury would have given Kell a sentence less than 
death. Kimmelman, All U.S. at 389; Taylor, 905 P.2d at 285. 
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17. The post-conviction court correctly rejected KelFs challenge to appellate 
counsel's representation. 
Kell also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective. To succeed on that claim, 
Kell would have had to prove that his counsel overlooked a claim that was obvious from the 
record and that probably would have succeed. Lafferty, 2007 UT 73 \ 48; Carter, 2001 UT 
96 \ 48. With one exception, Kell failed to identify any specific appellate claim that he 
contended his counsel had a constitutional duty to raise (KIIR271). 
The post-conviction court correctly granted summary judgment on KelPs generalized 
challenge that appellate counsel was ineffective. A mere allegation that appellate counsel 
was ineffective is insufficient as a matter of law to grant post-conviction relief. See Lafferty, 
2007 UT 73 f1J48-5l. 
Kell did claim that his appellate counsel should have argued that the transfer from 
Nevada was illegal (id.). However, as explained in point B8? that claim is frivolous. Kell 
had no constitutional right to counsel who would pursue frivolous claims. Cf. State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1982) (holding that defense counsel's performance was 
not deficient by failing to object to the admission of evidence he had already unsuccessfully 
challenged in a suppression hearing), overruled on other grounds, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986).24 
24For the first time in this Court, Kell also claims that his point II identifies two 
claims that appellate counsel should have raised and argued. For the reasons argued in 
point III above, Kell has not demonstrated either that counsel had an obligation to raise 
the claims or that they probably would have succeeded. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the court should affirm the post-conviction court's 
order granting summary judgment in the State's favor and denying post-conviction relief. 
DATED December 11, 2007. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Appellee's counsel 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
§ 78-3 5 a-104. Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who 
has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in 
the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of 
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the 
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was 
revoked in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at 
the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the 
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of reason-
able diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was 
known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the ne^ly discovered material 
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the 
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah 
Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be gov-
erned by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 
Laws 1996, c 235, § 4, eff. April 29, 1996. 
§ 78~35a-105. Burden of proof 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respon-
dent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to 
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996. 
§ 7 8-3 5 a— 106. Preclusion of relief—Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground 
that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, 
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Laws 1996, c 235, § 6, eff April 29, 1996. 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-
conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78~35a-101 et seq., Post-
Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and Venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by 
filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the 
judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms 
provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own 
motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a 
change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or 
witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the Petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the 
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Addition-
al claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised 
m subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall 
state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarcera-
tion; 
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sen-
tenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, 
together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the 
petitioner; 
' (3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the 
petitioner's claim to relief; 
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for 
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and 
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of 
the appeal; 
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in 
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number 
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results 
of the prior proceeding; and 
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered 
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time 
for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-
conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the Petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner 
shall attach to the petition: 
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allega-
tions; 
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court 
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction 
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or 
sentence; and 
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument 
or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a 
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign 
and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who 
sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the 
normal course. 
(g)(1) Summary Dismissal of Claims. The assigned judge shall review the 
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated 
in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its 
face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either 
that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. 
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim 
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal 
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations 
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired 
prior to the filing of the petition. 
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading 
error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall 
return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court 
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-convic-
tion petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of Petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes 
that all or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the 
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail 
upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or 
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney 
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. 
(i) Answer or Other Response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under 
these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the 
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have no1 been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon 
the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed 
for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No 
further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the 
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also 
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing 
conference, the court may: 
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to 
be presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the Petitioner at Hearings. The petitioner shall be present at 
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The 
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility 
where the petitioner is confined. 
(/) Discovery; Records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be 
allowed by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is 
good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with 
evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court 
may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. 
(m) Orders; Stay. 
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the 
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed 
for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to 
the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue 
a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the 
order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will 
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the 
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or 
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraign-
ment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be 
necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed 
under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is 
indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity 
that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and Sections 78-7-36 through 
78-7-43 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall 
determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be 
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of 
Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996.] 
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Grant W.p. Morrison #3666 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Troy Michael Kell 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 359-7999 
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IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TROY MICHAEL KELL, 
Petitioner, 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
vs. POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 030600171 
Respondent. : Judge David L. Mower 
. COMES NO¥J Petitioner Troy Michael Kell by and through his 
attorneys Grant W. P. Morrison and Aric Cramer, and petitions this 
court for a writ of habeas corpus and/or post conviction relief in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101, et. seq., and Rules 
65(b) and 65(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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1. Petitioner is confined in the Utah State prison located in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah in the custody of the warden of the 
Utah State Prison, Clint S. Friel. 
2. Petitioner is confined pursuant to a conviction entered on 
or about August 8, 1996, in the Sixth Judicial District Court for 
Sanpete County, Case Number 941600213. Petitioner was found guilty 
following a jury trial of Aggravated Murder, a Capital offense, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202. His sentence was death. 
3. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Utah Supreme 
Court, which has jurisdiction over capitol cases. The Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed his conviction in State v. Kell, 2002 Ut 19, 
originally filed February 8, 2002 but subsequently amended and 
filed November 1, 2002. 
4. The Supreme Court of the United States denied Kell's 
petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 
5. Troy Kell raised the following issues on appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court: 
a. The trial court erred by denying Kell his 
constitutional rights to a public trial, to the presumption of 
innocence, and to equal protection of the law, by truing him in a 
courtroom located inside the prison. This was the prison where the 
purported crime had occurred. 
b. The trial court violated Kell's constitutional rights 
to a fair trial by denying him an impartial jury as a result of the 
2 
trial court's rulings on voir dire and challenges for cause. 
c. The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury 
on the theory of imperfect self-defense manslaughter. Justice 
Durham and Justice Howe were of the view that any evidence, even 
the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant entitles a defendant 
to an instruction on his theory of the case, and that the trial 
judge should not make credibility determinations in criminal jury 
trials- They concluded that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense manslaughter, but that 
it was harmless error. Within this argument, the jury was 
specifically instructed to order its deliberations and not to 
consider lesser included offenses unless it found the defendant 
innocent of the greater offense. With regard to the manslaughter, 
the instructions stated x'Do not deliberate or vote on the charge of 
manslaughters lesser included offense, unless the State has failed 
to prove either aggravated murder or murder." The Court found that 
language to be improper. Nevertheless, the Court held that the 
instruction defining aggravated murder as including the absence of 
emotional disturbance ensured that manslaughter was considered 
before aggravated murder. 
d. The trial court erred by allowing jurors to view a 
videotape of the homicide. 
e. The trial court committed multiple evidentiary errors 
which individual and cumulatively deprived Kell of a fair trial. 
Included within this was the x'Dear Luther" letter, which the 
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defendant argued should not be admitted because of its prejudicial 
nature. Only portions of this letter were admitted. Other issues 
addressed, were, inter alia, statements allegedly made by Kell to 
a guard post event, statements made by inmate Francisco Colon, 
testimony and a small autopsy photograph. 
f. The prosecution denied Kell his rights to due process 
of law and protection under the eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by 
making improper arguments to the jury. This was raised as a 
prosecutorial misconduct issue. The Court acknowledged that, 
"although perhaps ill-advised because of their personal nature (the 
prosecutor had alluded to his mother having "substantial hardships'7 
during her childhood, yet did not become a criminal) , the 
prosecutor's statement did not constitute misconduct or plain 
error. 
g. The trial court erred during the penalty phase by 
refusing to allow the jury to consider mercy and sympathy as 
mitigating factors. 
h. The victim impact evidence admitted in the penalty 
phase and the statute which allows it, are unconstitutional. 
i. Section 76-5-202 of the Utah code, which describes 
the aggravating factors necessary for capital murder, is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face. 
j . The Utah death penalty statutes are unconstitutional 
because they do not narrow the class of death-eligible murders, 
thus encouraging the arbitrary and capricious application of the 
4 
death penalty. 
k. The capital sentencing proceedings were flawed. 
1. The imposition of the death penalty violated state 
and federal constitutional double jeopardy provisions because Kell 
had already been disciplined through the prisonfs disciplinary 
proceedings. State v. Kell, 61 P.2d at 1024-1025. This argument was 
dispatched as frivolous. 
6. The Petitioner has not previously sought post-conviction 
relief to challenge his conviction and sentence. 
7. Petitioner Troy Kell's conviction and sentence of death 
were obtained in violation on his rights under the Constitution of 
the United States, the Utah State Constitution, and the statutes 
and laws of the State of Utah based upon the following facts, and 
others to be developed after further investigation, discovery and 
evidentiary hearing, as may be allowed under the funds available, 
as set for below: 
8. Kell's right to a fair and impartial public trial and his 
right to due process of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
have been violated by being forced to stand trial inside the 
Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF). Although previously 
raised as an issue on appeal, they were not effectively argued by 
counsel as set forth below. 
a. Prior to trial, the question of trial security was 
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referred by Judge David L. Mower, the trial judge, to the presiding 
judge of the District, Judge K. I. McKiff. Judge McKiff, conducted 
independent research, considered security issues raised by the 
Department of Corrections, and made a determination that the trial 
should be held at the CUCF, prior to holding a hearing on the issue 
of trial security and place of trial. The court did not allow 
Kell's defense attorney sufficient notice and opportunity to 
prepare for the issues to be considered prior to the hearing, 
thereby denying Kell the right to due process and his Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel. 
b. The trial court decision was not based upon fact, but 
was based upon conclusions as to whether or not jurors would be 
unduly prejudiced by a trial in a prison setting and the right of 
petitioner to be tried by a Sanpete County jury. Kell had 
previously moved for a change of venue from Sanpete County and did 
not maintain the right to be tried by a Sanpete County jury. 
Kell's right to the presumption of innocence was compromised by the 
prison trial since jurors would likely consider him to be more 
dangerous or likely guilty due to the place of trial. 
Additionally, trial counsel did not argue or their arguments were 
inadequate, that the prejudice to Kell would be greatly enhanced by 
having the jury escorted in and out of all proceedings by a SWAT 
team, that the attendance of SWAT team members in the courtroom, 
whose very presence was intimidating by the close cropped or 
skinhead appearance of most of the team members, especially if the 
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inference were drawn they were Kell's friends; that Kell was 
required to testify while shackled, combined with the prison 
setting ensured that Kell would not receive a fair trial. 
c. The trial court did not properly weigh and consider 
the constitutional rights of the petitioner to a public trial in 
making the decision to hold the trial in the prison, thereby 
denying the petitioner his right to due process and his right to a 
fair public trial under the provisions of Article I Section 12 of 
the Utah State Constitution. The decision of the court was based 
primarily upon security issue concerns which should not have been 
considered. The Daniels Court held that "...we also point out that 
to hold a criminal trial in a courtroom located inside a prison or 
other facility simply because a defendant is already incarcerated, 
or because to do so would be more safe or convenient, would also be 
error, absent adequate findings and compelling reasons'''. Daniels, 
at paragraph 26. The public, although not barred from attending 
the trial, were discouraged by having to attend the proceedings in 
the prison. Counsel was impermissibly ineffective in failing to 
properly argue the preceding. 
d. The court, having concerns about the security during 
trial, failed to consider a more reasonable alternative such as 
moving the trial to a courtroom in another county, where there were 
court rooms which are secure, spacious and available. There are 
secure court rooms in both Sevier and Utah counties which are 
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within reasonable distance of Sanpete County, where numerous trials 
involving inmate witnesses and defendants considered serious 
security risks have been held. 
e. The proceedings at the prison not only included the 
jury trial of the guilt or innocence of Petitioner, but also the 
jury determination of whether Kell was sentenced to life or death. 
The fact that Kell's trial was held in the prison sent the implied 
message to the jury that petitioner was extraordinarily dangerous 
to the point that he could not be tried in a conventional court 
room. The combination of the charges and cumulative trial evidence 
within the setting of an inherently dangerous environment of a 
prison setting, led to the inexorable and entirely predictable 
sentence of death. 
9. The death qualification of the jury violated Kell's rights 
guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 7,9,10 and 12 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
a. The jurors who were impaneled to hear the evidence, 
determine the guilt or innocence of Kell, and to determine his 
sentence were death qualified. 
b. The process of death qualification results in jurors 
who are more prone to convict and to disregard the presumption of 
innocence than those who are not. This fact is borne out by 
professional studies conducted by competent experts in the fields 
of psychology and related fields. 
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10. The trial court removed potential jurors, V.D. and R.F., 
for cause based upon the reluctance of the jurors to impose the 
death penalty, thus violating Kell's rights guaranteed by the 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitutions, and Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
a. The State moved to remove V.D. for cause based upon 
her reservations concerning imposing the death penalty. The 
defense objected (R. 4404-05). 
b. The juror did not indicate that she would not impose 
the death penalty, only that she would have difficulty in doing so 
except in cases involving child molestation. She did not indicate 
that she would not impose the death penalty of that she could not 
follow the instructions of the court. The juror indicated that she 
did not have a conscientious objection to the death penalty. The 
juror indicated that she would listen to the evidence including 
aggravating and mitigating evidence and vote for the appropriate 
penalty and be fair (4393-4400) . 
c. The court granted the State's challenge for cause 
based upon the fact that the juror may be uncomfortable or 
reluctant to impose death rather than on a showing that the juror 
could not and would not impose the death penalty upon petitioner, 
regardless of the evidence ($. 4404-4406). 
d. The basis for removal of the juror for cause was 
improper under the guidelines set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 
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391 U.S. 510 (1968) . The preceding issues were not effectively 
raised by trial or appellate counsel. 
e* The State also moved to remove juror R. F. for cause 
based upon her reluctance to impose the death penalty. The defense 
objected. (R. 4353-4354). 
f. R. F. stated that although she would have difficulty 
in imposing the death penalty, she could do so in an extreme case. 
She indicated that she would have to hear the evidence and then 
under the appropriate circumstances she could possibly impose the 
death penalty. (R. 4347) . The juror also indicated that she had no 
conscientious objection to the death penalty. (R. 4349). 
g. The trial court granted the prosecutions challenge to 
cause upon the basis that there was a question about whether or not 
the juror did have a conscientious objection to the death penalty. 
(R. 4355). 
h. The basis for removal of the juror for cause was 
improper under the guidelines set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 510 (1968) . 
11. The trial court improperly denied Kell' s challenges for 
cause thus violating Kell's rights guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Sections 7 , 9, 10 and 12 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. These arguments were either not raised by trial and 
appellate counsel, or were not effectively raised. 
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e. Kell challenged for cause on the basis of the 
expressed bias of the juror. The trial court denied Kell's 
challenge. (R. 4155-4156). 
f. Juror D.S. revealed in her answers to the 
questionnaire that she had been told about the crime scene by her 
husband, that she was acquainted with several of the State's 
witnesses, that she knew too much about the case, that her husband 
worked at the Central Utah Correctional Facility and had been 
involved in cleaning up the crime scene, that she could not be fair 
and that she had formed an opinion about the case. 
g. During voir dire questioning, D.S. indicated that she 
had doubts about her ability to base her decisions on the evidence 
in the case and whether or not she could separate what she had been 
told about the case from the evidence presented in the courtroom 
and that if she were Kell, she would not feel comfortable having a 
juror with her state of mind hear the case. (R. 3723-3726) . 
h. Kell challenged the juror based upon her voir dire 
responses. The trial court denied his challenge for cause. (R. 
3729) 
i. Juror S. M. indicated in her answers to the juror 
questionaire that she was biased due to her belief that prisoner's 
have too many rights and that she felt it would be a financial 
hardship for her to serve. S.M. indicated during voir dire that 
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she would have difficulty setting aside her own beliefs as to what 
she thought the law ought to be and following the instructions on 
the law given by the court* (R. 34 60-34 61) . She also felt that her 
job and financial commitments would make it difficult to 
concentrate on the trial (R. 3774-3775). 
j. Kell challenged S. M. for cause. The trial court 
denied Kell's challenge. (R. 3778). 
k. Juror C. L. indicated difficulty in serving due to 
job concerns since he was one of two veterinarians in two counties, 
that he knew several of the State's witnesses, and that he was 
employed as a veterinarian by the Central Utah Correctional 
Facility. During voir dire examination, he indicated that he had 
heard a lot about the case and that it would be interesting to see 
if he could set aside what he had already heard (R. 4105) . He 
expressed difficulty in committing to consider extreme emotional 
stress of mental disturbance as a mitigating factor (R. 4116-4117). 
1. Kell challenged C. L. for cause based on his 
unwillingness to consider extreme emotional stress or mental 
disturbance as a mitigating factor. The court denied Kell's 
challenge. Trial counsel failed adequately challenge C. L. for 
cause for his preconceived beliefs relating to the guilt or 
innocence of Kell, and his employment status as an employee of 
CUCF, and his relationship with "several" of the State's witnesses. 
m. The denial of Kell's challenges for cause violated 
Kell's rights guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, 
Sections 7, 9, 10 and 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
12. Kell's right to a fair and impartial public trial were 
violated by the denial of his Motion for a Change of Venue to a 
county other than Sanpete County. Kell had requested that the 
trial be held in Salt Lake County due to heightened publicity and 
potential difficulties in obtaining a fair trial in Sanpete County. 
a. Although there was initially state-wide publicity 
regarding Kell's case, the publicity was much more intense in 
Sanpete County, where the offense occurred. The Central Utah 
Correctional Facility is located in the city of Gunnison, located 
in Sanpete County. The numerous law enforcement officers involved 
in the case are residents of Sanpete County, as were most of the 
witnesses called in the case. The chance of outside influence upon 
the jury through media reports, knowledge or close association with 
witnesses or other improper influences required the case to be 
moved to a county with fewer risks for juror contamination. 
b. Although Kell requested trial in Salt Lake County, he 
did not object to trial in another county other than Sanpete. 
c. Although the court determined that there were 
sufficient security concerns to require that the trial be held in 
a prison facility and expressed concerns about whether such a trial 
would result in a denial of Kell's constitutional rights to a fair 
public trial, the court denied the Motion for a Change of Venue. 
d. Trial and Appellate counsel were derelict in failing 
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to raise this issue on appeal. 
13. The Petitioner's right to a fair trial, due process of 
law and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by 
the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10, and 12 of the 
Utah State Constitution by failure of the trial court and defense 
counsel to give an adequate reasonable doubt instruction. 
a. The trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was 
constitutionally flawed since it did not provide sufficient 
guidance to the burden of proof to the jurors. 
b. During the penalty phase of the trial, defense 
counsel did not object to the submission to the jury of the 
standard of proof. 
14. Kell's right to a fair trial was fundamentally denied by 
the admission, over objection, to the videotape. Although the Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that the videotape was admissible, 
appellate counsel, was remiss in not arguing cumulative, after 
having the medical examiner's testimony, autopsy report and 
numerous witnesses. 
15. Kell's right to a fair trial was violated by the improper 
admission of evidence. 
a. The trial court allowed admission of a letter from 
Kell called the "Dear Luther'7 letter. Only partial portions of the 
letter were admitted and defense counsel failed to effectively 
present the entirety of the letter. Had the entirety of the letter 
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been introduced, not just selected "racist" parts, the jury would 
have had an entirety different perception. 
b. The autopsy report of the medical examiner Dr. 
Maureen Frikke, was admitted over the objection of defense counsel, 
and the report was allowed to be sent back with the jury while it 
deliberated. This issue was not raised by appellate counsel, and 
defense counsel was derelict in failing to raise this issue. 
16. Kell's conviction and death sentence were obtained as a 
result of other incidences of ineffective trial counsel, which 
occurred prior to or during the trial of the petitioner, as 
follows: 
a. Trial counsel failed to conduct effective and 
complete pretrial investigation and was not able to devote the 
necessary time to Kell's case due to the rigorous demand's of trial 
counsel's practice. 
b. Trial counsel filed a pretrial motion for a change of 
venue from Sanpete County, State of Utah, to Salt Lake County, but 
did not consider other venues closer in proximity to Sanpete 
County. 
c. Trial counsel's motion for a change of venue was not 
support by any data such as polls, questionaires, or other 
demographic information to support the grounds for moving the 
trial. 
d. Trial counsel failed to adequately and effectively 
brief and raise all of the issues regarding holding the trial in 
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the Central Utah Correctional facility, including obtaining data 
from experts on the effect of the prison location upon jurors, 
witnesses, and Kell's right to a public trial. 
e. Trial counsel failed to seek interlocutory review of 
the adverse ruling on the issue of venue and trial in the prison. 
f. Trial counsel failed to adequately brief and research 
pretrial motions which were filed. 
g. Trial counsel failed to file pretrial motions to 
prevent the introduction of improper evidence. 
h. Trial counsel failed to properly investigate and 
interview state's potential witnesses and to locate and secure 
rebuttal witnesses and evidence. Included in this were inmates 
John Gallegos, James Setty and Doug Pierce who could have rebutted 
the State's argument that there were procedures in place to handle 
redress of inmate threats, and two black inmates who knew Kell and 
could rebut the racist claim. Further, defense counsel failed to 
secure the jackets of the State's witnesses, which could have 
revealed potential credibility issues; at the very least the 
claimed racist statements made by Kell purported heard by other 
inmates were never requested by defense counsel. 
i. Trial counsel failed to adequately advise Kell about 
the necessity not to engage in conversation about the case with 
custodial officers or other persons outside the presence of 
counsel. 
j. Trial counsel failed to adequately review and make 
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objection to the improper original transfer of Kell under the 
Interstate Compact Agreement. 
k. Trial counsel failed to appropriately investigate and 
illustrate prosecutorial misconduct relating to Francisco Colon, 
whose testimony was devastating at trial, and proper investigation 
would have shown Colon's testimony to be perjured. 
1. Trial counsel was ineffective during the jury 
selection process by failed to appropriately challenge jurors for 
cause which forced Kell to expend his peremptory challenges to 
remove those jurors. 
m. Potential juror Gerald Zabriskie indicated that he 
would impose the death penalty if the State proved a vicious crime, 
that he knew several of the State's witnesses, that the 
circumstances under which he would consider a penalty other than 
the death penalty would be if the defendant were provoked, that it 
was not an individual judgment as to whether the death penalty 
should be imposed and that the death penalty was not imposed soon 
enough after conviction. This juror was passed for cause by Kellfs 
counsel despite issues of bias and unwillingness to make an 
individual determination of the issues. (R. 3490-3498). 
n. Potential juror Helen H. Syme did not indicate that 
she would hold the State to its burden of proof, indicating that 
she "guessed" she would. Symes indicated that she felt the 
defendant should prove his innocence and when asked if defendant 
did not take the stand if she would hold it against him said 
18 
initially that she did not know, then did not positively indicate 
that she would render a decision based upon her own beliefs as to 
what penalty would be appropriate. Kell's counsel passed this 
juror for cause despite the lack of total commitment to a decision 
based upon her individual judgment. (R. 3674-75), then used one of 
Kell's peremptory challenges to excuse the juror. 
o. Potential juror Dan Brinkerhoff indicated that his 
son worked at the Central Utah Correctional facility and was 
working at the time of the homicide and that he believed the death 
penalty was appropriate in every case of intentional murder, 
although he did later indicate that he would not "automatically" 
impose the death penalty in every case of intentional homicide. 
Kell's counsel did not challenge this juror for cause (R.3796-
3801), then used one of Kell's peremptories to excuse the juror. 
p. Potential juror Earl J. Brewer indicated that he 
would impose the death penalty in cases where the murder was 
premeditated. When asked again he indicated that if it was planned 
there were no circumstances under which he would not impose death. 
Although there might be circumstances where he would consider 
mitigating evidence, the tenor of his responses was that he would 
impose the death penalty in cases where the penalty was 
premeditated. The juror also indicated that he had a brother who 
worked at the prison. There was no inquiry as to whether or not 
that relationship would cause the juror to favor the prison 
employees who were witnesses in the case or whether he could give 
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equal consideration to those who may testify adversely. Kellfs 
counsel did not challenge for cause (R. 3839-43) and counsel used 
one of Kell's peremptory challenges to remove the juror. 
q. Potential juror Elaine S. Redmond indicated that she 
thought Kell should prove his innocence and that Ross Blackham, one 
of the prosecutors, was her divorce attorney. During the voir 
dire, prosecutor Blackham addressed the juror by her first name, 
Elaine, potentially indicating he had more than a casual 
acquaintance with the juror. Kell's counsel did not challenge for 
cause (R. 4220-24) and defense counsel used one of Kell's 
peremptory challenges to remove her. 
r. Kell's trial counsel failed to object to improper 
opening statements made by the prosecution, and this issue was not 
raised on appeal. 
s. Trail counsel failed to adequately advise Kell as to 
whether or not Kell should testify in the guilt/innocence phase of 
the trial where he would be subject to cross examination. 
t. Trial counsel failed to have bench conferences 
transcribed to preserve the record of the proceedings, even though 
this was a death penalty case. 
17. Kell's conviction and death sentence were obtained as a 
result of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his 
rights guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Sections 7, 9 
and 12 of the Utah State Constitution which occurred during the 
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penalty phase of the trial. 
a. Trial counsel did not object to the improper opening 
statement of the prosecutor* 
b. Trial counsel did not make an opening statement 
informing the jury of Kellfs position. 
c. Trial counsel did not object to the presentation of 
highly prejudicial victim impact testimony. 
d. Trial counsel presented witnesses who were 
detrimental to Kell and who gave aggravation evidence rather than 
mitigation evidence. 
e. Trial counsel did not object to improper closing 
arguments from the prosecution. 
18. Kellfs Appellate counsel was ineffective. 
a. Keilfs conviction and death sentence were upon on 
appeal as a result of ineffective counsel. 
b. Appellate counsel failed to adequately brief and 
raise relevant issues on appeal, as reflected herein. 
c. Appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of the 
legality of Kell's transfer from Nevada to Utah. 
d. Absent the errors and omissions of trial and 
appellate counsel, there is a reasonable likelihood that petitioner 
would not have been convicted of aggravated murder, and a 
reasonable likelihood that petitioner would not have been sentenced 
to death. 
Wherefore, the petitioner prays as follows: 
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1. That the Court issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus or as 
otherwise specified in the Post Conviction Remedies Act, and have 
the petitioner brought before this Court in order to be discharged 
from his unconstitutional confinement and restrain, and relieved on 
his unconstitutional sentence of death. 
2. Conduct a hearing wherein proof may be offered in support 
of the allegations of this petition. 
3. For other such further relief as may be appropriate. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 2005. 
MORRISON 6c MORRISON, L.C. 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
Aric Cramer 
Attorneys for Troy M. Kell 
Certificate of Service 
This is to certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing, to: 
Thomas B. Brunker, Esq. 
Christopher D. Ballard, Esq. 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
on the 1st day of August, 2005. 
£ 6 ^ ^ ^ 
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Grant W.P. Morrison #3666 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Troy Michael Kell 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 359-7999 
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774 
Aric Cramer #5460 
Cramer & Cramer, L.L.C. 
Smith Hyatt Building 
845 South Main Street, Suite 23 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 299-9999 
Facsimile: (801) 298-5161 
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TROY MICHAEL KELL, 
Petitioner, : ADDITION TO 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
VS. POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS 
: CORPUS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 030600171 
Respondent. : Judge David L. Mower 
COMES NOW Petitioner Troy Michael Kell by and through his 
attorneys Grant W. P. Morrison and Aric Cramer, and provides page 
11 to the previously submitted Amended Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus. This page was inadvertently 
left out of the filing. 
1 
Dated this 8th day of August, 2005. 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
'Grant W. P. Morrison 
Aric Cramer 
Attorneys for Troy M. Kell 
Certificate of Service 
This is to certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing, to: 
Thomas B. Brunker, Esq. 
Christopher D. Ballard, Esq. 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
on the 8th day of August, 2005. 
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(a) Juror M.C. stated that he would impose the death 
penalty in any case where intentional homicide was proven. (R. 
3393)• Although he later indicated that he would listen to the 
evidence and follow the instruction (R. 3400) , he then later 
reinstated his intent to impose the death penalty for intentional 
or knowing murder (R. 3401) and that the concept of an "eye for an 
eye" is correct (R. 3402-3403) . 
(b) Defense counsel challenged for cause, but the trial 
court denied the challenge, (R. 3408) . 
(c) Juror N.B. revealed that he had known the head 
prosecutor for over twenty-one years, and that he knew him to be a 
good man. Further, he stated that he did not know the defense 
counsel and that he would give the prosecutor more credence than he 
would afford defense counsel and that in a close case his 
friendship with prosecutor Ross Blackham would cause him to side 
with the prosecution. (R. 4189) 
(d) N. B. also indicated that he had heard a lot about 
the case and that he was not sure he could set aside what he had 
heard. (R. 4141). 
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Addendum C 
FJLEB 
SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH 
2087 JRN 2 3 fifl 9 OH 
;> SANPETE COUNTY CLERK 
Ml^Zyu^d DEPUTY 
DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH 
160 NORTH MAIN, P.O. Box 100 
MANTI, UTAH 84642 
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135 
TROY MICHAEL KELL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030600171 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. M O W E R 
This case is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial 
Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case law, and 
all applicable statutory provisions. Oral argument was scheduled for November 22, 2006, but did 
not take place. After a Motion to Continue that hearing was denied, the parties stipulated to 
submit the Motion based on the written memoranda. The Court now issues this ruling granting 
Respondent's Motion. 
Procedural History 
Following a jury trial held in the Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF) in 1996, 
Petitioner was found guilty of aggravated murder in the death of Lonnie Blackmon. Petitioner 
was subsequently sentenced to death by the jury at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the 
trial. 
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Petitioner's conviction and sentence were automatically reviewed by the Utah Supreme 
Court. On November 11, 2002, the Supreme Court issued a decision affirming Petitioner's 
conviction and sentence. See State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019 (Utah 2002). 
A Preliminary Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed by the Petitioner on May 16, 
2003. On August 1, 2005, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his conviction and death sentence. 
On December 2, 2005, Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Petitioner's opposition was filed on March 31, 2006. Respondent's reply was filed on 
June 20, 2006. Request to Submit for Decision was filed on June 29, 2006. 
Summary of the Parties' Arguments 
Petitioner makes the following claims that challenge his conviction and sentence: 
a. issues related to the jury selection process, such as death qualification and errors 
committed by the trial court judge concerning excusals and challenges for cause; 
b. issues related to the fairness of the trial proceedings such as improper instructions 
and errors in admitting evidence; 
c. ineffective assistance of trial counsel such as failure to conduct a complete 
pretrial investigation or to devote the necessary time to the case, failure to 
consider other places for change of venue, failure to support the motion for 
change of venue with data, polls, etc., failure to brief and raise issues related to 
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whether the trial should be held in the CUCF, failure to seek interlocutory review 
of the trial court's ruling on the venue issue, failure to adequately brief and 
research pretrial motions, failure to properly investigate and interview the State's 
potential witnesses, failure to tell the Petitioner not to talk to custodial officers, 
failure to object to the improper original transfer of Petitioner under the Interstate 
Compact Agreement, failure to properly investigate and illustrate prosecutorial 
misconduct, failure to appropriately challenge jurors during jury selection, failure 
to object to improper opening statements, failure to advise Petitioner that if he 
testified he would be subject to cross-examination, and failure to have the bench 
conferences during the trial recorded; 
d. ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase of the trial such as 
failure to object to improper opening statements of the prosecutor, failure to make 
an opening statement, failure to object to prejudicial victim impact evidence, 
improperly calling witnesses that provided aggravating evidence, and failure to 
object to improper closing arguments by the prosecutor; and 
e. ineffective assistance of appellate counsel such as failure to raise ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel issues, failure to adequately brief and raise relevant 
issues on appeal, and failure to raise the issue of the legality of Petitioner's 
transfer from the State of Nevada to the State of Utah. 
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Respondent is seeking summary judgment arguing that (1) some claims are procedurally 
barred because they were raised and rejected on appeal; (2) some claims are barred because they 
could have been raised on appeal but were not; (3) some claims are not properly supported with 
facts sufficient to entitle Petitioner to post-conviction relief. 
Analysis1 
Section 1. Claims Previously Raised and Rejected on Direct Appeal 
A petition for post-conviction relief is not "a substitute for direct appellate review;" it 
only "collaterally attacks a conviction and/or a sentence." Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 
(Utah 1994). Thus, "[ijssues raised and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or a sentence 
cannot properly be raised again in a [post-conviction petition] and should be dismissed as an 
abuse of the writ without a ruling on the merits." Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
106(l)(b). 
This general rule is subject to several exceptions. Claims that fall under this rule would 
not be dismissed if "there has been an intervening change of controlling authority ... , new 
evidence has become available, or ... [the Utah Supreme Court's] prior decision was clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 31 P.3d 
543, 546410 (Utah 2001). 
The Court will follow Respondent's numbering of the claims raised in the Amended Petition i.e. the first 
claim raised by the Petitioner m paragraph 8 will be referred to as claim 8 rather than claim 1, etc. 
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All of the following claims were previously raised and rejected on direct appeal: 
1. claim 8 alleging that "the trial court erred by denying [Petitioner] his 
constitutional rights to a public trial, to the presumption of, and to equal 
protection of the law[ ] by trying him in a courtroom located inside [CUCF]." 
Amended Petition at 2. See Kell at 1026-27, ffijl 1-16; 
2. claim 10 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's fair trial rights by 
granting the prosecutor's request to remove two potential jurors for cause based 
upon their reluctance to impose a sentence of death, see Id. at 1027-28, ^[17-20; 
3. claim 11 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's rights to fair trial by 
improperly denying his challenges for cause, see Id. at 1028, ^21; 
4. claim 14 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's rights to fair trial by 
allowing the jury to view a videotape of the homicide, see Id. at 1030-31, lft[29-
31; and 
5. claim 15(b) alleging that Petitioner's rights to fair trial were violated because his 
trial counsel failed to challenge the admission of the autopsy report, and his 
appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on appeal. See Id. at 1031-32, ^ [37. 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that any of the exceptions described above apply here. 
Therefore, these claims are procedurally barred under Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-35a-
106(l)(b). 
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With respect to several of these claims, the Petitioner suggests that they were not 
effectively raised and argued by counsel and, therefore, his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal was violated. See Amended Petition at 5, 10, 15, and 
16. 
The ineffective assistance of counsel exception does not apply to claims that have been 
raised on direct appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2). A contrary rule would allow an 
issue already disposed of on direct appeal to be relitigated "under a different guise." Gardner at 
615. Petitioner should not be allowed to do that. 
For these reasons, Petitioner's claims 8, 10, 11, 14, and 15(b) are dismissed. 
Section 2. Claims Petitioner Could Have Raised on Appeal But Did Not 
Claims that could and should have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised for the 
first time in a post-conviction petition. See Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 630, [^6 (Utah 2001). 
The exception is where a petitioner can demonstrate that "the failure to raise [these issues] was 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2). 
There are two claims that fall under this category: claim 9 and claim 13(a). Claim 9 
alleges that the "process of death qualification results in jurors who are more prone to convict 
and to disregard the presumption of innocence than those who are not." Amended Petition at 8. 
Claim 13(a) alleges that "the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally 
flawed since it did not provide sufficient guidance to the burden of proof to the jurors." Id. at 15. 
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Petitioner had sufficient facts at the time of his direct appeal to raise both of these claims 
before the Utah Supreme Court, but he chose not to do so. Petitioner has not shown that his 
failure to raise these claims was due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
It follows that claims 9 and 13(a) are barred by Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-35a-106(2). These claims are dismissed. 
Section 3. Claims for which Respondent has Requested Summary Judgment and No 
Objection Was Raised in Petitioner's Opposing Memorandum 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). The purpose of summary judgment is 
"to eliminate the time, trouble^] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 
542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
When a moving party satisfies his burden of producing sufficient evidence, the opposing 
party has his own burden to meet. He must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial;" mere allegations or denials of the pleadings are not sufficient. Utah R. 
Civ. P., Rule 56(e). If the party does not respond with specific facts, "[s]ummary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against... [him]." TS1 Partnership v. Alfred, 877 P.2d 156, 158 
(UtahApp. 1994). 
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A similar requirement is also found in Rule 65C(c)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Petitioner is required to set forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form 
the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief." If necessary, the petitioner should "attach to the 
petition ... affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations." Id. Rule 
65C(d)(l). 
Petitioner chose not to respond to the Respondent's request for summary judgment on the 
portion of claim 16(e) which asserts that Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
seek interlocutory review of the trial court's decision to try Petitioner at the CUCF. See 
Amended Petition at 17. 
Petitioner has failed to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Consistent with Rule 56, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on that portion of 
claim 16(e). 
Section 4. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel at the Guilt or Innocence 
Phase 
Subsection 1. Standard of Review 
To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner must 
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each prong of the test set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984). Under this test, Petitioner is required to 
show that (1) counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687; see also Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
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(Utah 1988); State v. Geaiy, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). The Court may look at those 
requirements in any order and if "it is easier to dispose of ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 
lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed." Id. at 697. 
Further, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made errors so serious that [he] 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 
687. The seriousness of any errors is judged by whether counsel's representation was 
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. 
There is a strong presumption that counsel's representation "falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. This presumption is partially based on the idea 
that counsel's actions are determined in many cases by the choices of the defendant and the 
information supplied by the defendant. Id. at 691. 
Therefore, in evaluating counsel's performance, the Court must make "every effort... to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 
689. Moreover, the assessment of counsel's performance cannot be based upon "what is prudent 
or appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled." United States v. Cronic, 466 
US 648, 665 n.38(1984). 
Even if ineffectiveness is proven, prejudice must also be shown. To show prejudice, 
petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability [such that it undermines 
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confidence in the outcome] that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different2." Id. at 694. 
Subsection 2. Claim 13fb) 
In claim 13(b), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to provide an 
adequate reasonable doubt instruction. In the context of giving instructions, trial counsel 
performs deficiently if "the instructions, taken as a whole, [do not] correctly communicate the 
principle of reasonable doubt." State v. Cruz, 122 P.3d 543, 550, P21(Utah 2005), citing In re 
Winship, 397 US 358, 364 (1970). This means that the jury must be instructed that every fact 
necessary to constitute a crime must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Id. 
Petitioner does not describe how the reasonable doubt instruction was inadequate. He 
asserts that it was inadequate without giving any further facts or analysis. 
Petitioner is required under Rules 65C(d)(l) and 56(e) to present facts and support them 
with necessary affidavits, copies of record, or other evidence. Petitioner did not do that. 
Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning trial counsel's effectiveness with 
respect to reasonable doubt instmction. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
on claim 13(b). 
Subsection 3. Claim 15(a) 
This showing is greater than simply demonstrating "that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding," but less than demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered 
the outcome m the case." Strickland at 693. 
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Claim 15(a) alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to admit into evidence 
the entire "Dear Luther" letter. Petitioner claims that if "the entirety of the letter been introduced, 
not just selected 'racist' parts, the jury would have had an entire[l]y different perception." 
Amended Petition at 15-16. In response to the State, Petitioner says that the Court "must assume 
that the letter would have assisted [him]" because the Court must look at all the facts in light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. Mem. in Opp. at 42. Petitioner does not cite to any 
authority supporting this argument. 
Petitioner's argument misstates the law. The Court is only required to believe the 
evidence and the facts presented by the non-moving party, which are properly supported by 
affidavits and other documents. See Anderson v. American Liberty Lobby, Inc., All US 242, 255 
(1986); Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 65C(d)(l) and Rule 56(e). The Court does not have to assume that 
the Petitioner's legal conclusions are correct. 
It appears that claim 15(a) is not properly supported by evidence. Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on claim 15(a) is granted. 
Subsection 4. Claim 16(a) 
Here, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to devote sufficient time to the case 
and failed to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation. However, he does not indicate how these 
failings have prejudiced his case. He also does not give specific examples of deficiencies during 
the pretrial investigation. Petitioner's only argument is that his allegation alone "is enough 
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procedurally to pass summary judgment and not be dismissed." Mem. in Opp. at 43. 
This is again an incorrect statement of the law. As discussed in Subsection 3, Petitioner is 
required to produce facts and other evidence in support of his claim to show that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact that precludes entry of summary judgment. Because Petitioner has 
failed to do that, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on claim 16(a) is granted. 
Subsection 5. Claims 16(b) and (c) 
Petitioner asserts in claim 16(b) that his trial counsel failed to consider other possible 
venue sites for the trial other than Salt Lake City. He says that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to adequately support the motion for change of venue with "data such as polls, 
questionaires [sic], or other demographic information to support the grounds for moving the 
trial." Amended Petition at 16. In his opposing memorandum, Petitioner argues that counsel 
should have been aware during voir dire that an impartial jury could not be selected and that 
"had a sufficient amount of work been done, the venue of the trial as well as the CUCF matter 
would have been concluded elsewhere." Mem. in Opp. at 39. 
These statements are re-assertions of the original claims brought by the Petitioner in his 
post-conviction petition. They do not contain sufficient facts to form a claim for relief under 
Rule 65C(c)(3). Moreover, even if the trial counsel's performance was deficient, Petitioner has 
failed to submit evidence demonstrating that his case was prejudiced by it. Petitioner did not 
show that his counsel's ineffective perfomiance undermined his constitutional right to a fair trial 
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and impartial jury. 
Since Petitioner did not submit facts that support his allegations, Respondent is entitled 
to summary judgment on claims 16(b) and (c). 
Subsection 6. Claim 16fd) 
In claim 16(d), Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to adequately "brief and raise all 
of the issues regarding holding the trial in the Central Utah Correctional Facility, including 
obtaining data from experts on the effect of the prison location upon jurors, witnesses, and 
[Petitioner's] right to a public trial." Amended Petition at 16-17. Petitioner furnishes no facts 
indicating what type of evidence trial counsel should have obtained and presented to the trial 
court or what specific expert testimony would have provided concerning the effect of the prison 
location on jurors and witnesses. 
In his opposing memorandum, Petitioner states that prior counsel has indicated that 
providing the trial court with expert evidence, as well as "other court holdings," would have 
resulted in the trial not being held at the CUCF. 
Again, Petitioner does not submit specific facts to support his claim. Respondent, 
therefore, is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(d). 
Subsection 7. Claim 16fe) 
Claim 16(e) alleges failure of trial counsel "to seek interlocutory review of the adverse 
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ruling on the issue of venue and trial in the prison." Amended Petition at 17. Petitioner supports 
his claim with the recent case of State v. Stubbs, 123 P.3d 407 (Utah 2005). Mem. in Opp. at 38. 
In Stubbs, the Utah Supreme Court encouraged defendants to bring up questions of venue on 
interlocutory appeal prior to going to trial3. At 410, TflO, n.3. 
Even in light of the Stubbs decision, Petitioner still has to satisfy the Strickland standard. 
Strickland mandates "that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time." At 689. Applying the Supreme Court's dictum in Stubbs to 
evaluate trial counsel's performance in Petitioner's case would be doing precisely what 
Strickland instructs should not be done, namely, relying on hindsight. 
Petitioner provides no additional evidence or argument demonstrating that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in choosing not to seek interlocutory review of the denial of the motion 
to change venue. Thus, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(e). 
Subsection 8. Claims 16(f) and (g) 
In claim 16(f), Petitioner asserts that "trial counsel failed to adequately brief and research 
pretrial motions which were filed." Amended Petition at 17. Claim 16(g) alleges that "trial 
The precise language from Stubbs is, "[although most cases have been presented to us following a 
conviction, we encourage the defendants to raise venue questions on interlocutory appeal This both ensures fairness at 
trial and discourages the defendants fiom abusing the appeals process by waiting until the trial is over to resolve this 
issue." At 410, If 10, n3 
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counsel failed to file pretrial motions to prevent the introduction of improper evidence." Id. 
Petitioner says that under Rule 65C(c)(3) he is only required to state in concise terms the 
facts that form the basis of his claim; and he is not obligated to support his claims with evidence 
or affidavits. See Mem. in Opp. at 19. He further says that "[cjounsel has again shown that 
pretrial motions were either not done correctly, or were completely skipped ... [and that this] 
sufficiently [lays] the issue out with enough particularity to pass summary judgment and 
dismissal." Id. at 43. 
Petitioner does not tell the Court which pre-trial motions were inadequately briefed. He 
also does not explain what evidence should have been the subject of a motion to suppress. 
Petitioner's claims are again not properly supported with facts as required by Rules 
65C(d)(l) and 56(e). Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claims 16(f) and 
(g). 
Subsection 9. Claim 16(h) 
In claim 16(h), Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
sufficiently investigate, interview, or secure potential witnesses. Petitioner says that the 
testimony of those witnesses would show that there were no effective procedures in prison to 
handle inmate threats. 
Claim 16(h) also alleges failure of counsel to secure the "jackets" of the State's 
witnesses, which could have revealed potential credibility issues, and to obtain racist statements 
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that were allegedly overheard by fellow inmates. In response to the State, Petitioner says that he 
"has sufficiently claimed the facts with enough particularity that evidence should be taken. This 
allegation is sufficient to pass summary judgment and dismissal." Mem. in Opp. at 44. 
The State argued at the trial that there were procedures in prison for addressing inmate 
threats. Petitioner identifies three potential witnesses whom trial counsel should have 
interviewed and whose testimony could have rebutted that argument. 
Even if the trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable here, Petitioner has 
not provided any evidence demonstrating prejudice. 
Petitioner also fails to support the rest of claim 16(h) with specific facts. He does not 
identify the two black witnesses who knew the Petitioner and could have rebutted the "racist 
claim." He does not tell what testimony they would have provided. He also does not specify 
what potential impeachment evidence would have been discovered if the trial counsel secured 
the "jackets" of the State's witnesses. 
In its motion for summary judgment, Respondent "identified] the portions of the 
pleadings or supporting documents which it believes demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact." TS 1 Partnership at 158. Petitioner was required under Rule 56(e) to respond 
with specific facts. Petitioner did not do it. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary 
judgment on claim 16(h). 
Subsection 10. Claim 16(1) 
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Here, Petitioner claims trial counsel failed to warn him about the dangers of engaging in 
conversations with custodial officers or other persons outside of counsel's presence. See 
Amended Petition at 17. Petitioner does not describe any specific conversations of that nature. 
Respondent refers to a specific incident where Petitioner commented to the guards just prior to 
being escorted into the courtroom on the day he made an unsworn statement to jurors during the 
penalty phase. The guards testified they heard Petitioner say he was going to feign remorse. 
Petitioner argues that under the state and federal constitutions, trial counsel had a duty to 
warn him about the "adversary nature of the proceedings." Mem. in Opp. at 45. The State replies 
that Petitioner does not specify the information of which his trial counsel should have been 
aware and which should have triggered a duty to warn. Mem. in Supp. at 78. 
Even if trial counsel was ineffective in failing to warn, Petitioner did not demonstrate 
prejudice. Petitioner did not show that the jury's verdict would have probably been different if 
the guards did not testify about Petitioner's comments. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to 
summary judgment on claim 16(i). 
Subsection 11, Claim 16fj) 
In claim 16(j), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
"adequately review and make objection to the improper original transfer of [Petitioner] under the 
Interstate Compact Agreement." Amended Petition at 17-18. Petitioner says that the illegal 
transfer resulted in a due process violation because prison staff purposely placed him in a "kill 
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or be killed" situation that required him to defend himself by taking another person's life. 
Petitioner's due process argument rests upon his self-defense claim. This claim was 
litigated in Petitioner's direct appeal and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. See Kelt at 1028-
29, ^[22-25. Therefore, the Petitioner did not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
failure to raise this due process issue. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 
16©. 
Subsection 12. Claim 16fk) 
Claim 16(k) alleges trial counsel failed to properly investigate and illustrate prosecutorial 
misconduct relating to the testimony of Francisco Colon, one of the prosecution's key witnesses 
against Petitioner at trial. Petitioner argues that Francisco Colon perjured himself at trial. 
Respondent replies that Petitioner "alleges insufficient facts to show that Colon perjured 
himself, that the prosecutor knew this, or that there is any reasonable likelihood that the perjured 
testimony could have affected the outcome." Mem. in Supp. at 80. 
Petitioner denies the facts raised in Respondent's memorandum, but again fails to support 
his claim with specific facts. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 
16(k). 
Subsection 13. Claim 16(D-(q) 
In claims 16(l)-(q), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
properly challenge five prospective jurors for cause. This subsequently forced him to expend 
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peremptory challenges in order to have them removed. 
Respondent argues that the record does not demonstrate sufficient bias on the part of 
these prospective jurors "to overcome the presumption that counsel made a legitimate choice not 
to challenge these jurors for cause." Mem. in Supp. at 45. In response, Petitioner denies the 
additional facts presented in Respondent's memorandum and asks for an evidentiary hearing to 
allow him to challenge trial counsel and to show that one or more biased jurors decided his case. 
See Mem. in Opp. at 37. 
The jury selection process is characterized as "highly subjective, judgmental, and 
intuitive." State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 99, [^20 (Utah 2000). Because of the nature of the jury 
selection process, counsel's choice is presumed to be conscious and strategic and to constitute 
effective assistance unless shown otherwise. Id. In order to overcome this presumption, 
Petitioner must show either (1) that failure to remove a juror was not a product of conscious 
choice because counsel was inattentive or indifferent; or (2) that a prospective juror expressed a 
very strong bias; or (3) that there is no plausible justification for counsel's choice. Id. at 100, 
125. 
Petitioner did not demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact with respect to any of 
these factors. 
The facts show that trial counsel was attentive and engaged during the jury selection 
process. He asked specific questions concerning prospective jurors' views on the death penalty, 
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their ability to be impartial, whether they could avoid drawing any negative inferences about the 
Petitioner if he chose not to testify, and whether they could follow the law as instructed by the 
court. 
Petitioner says that the prospective jurors he identified in his claim were biased. 
However, he did not show that their bias was "strong and unequivocal." Id. 
Finally, Petitioner did not submit any evidence demonstrating that counsel's decision not 
to challenge these jurors was not plausibly justifiable. 
Even if trial counsel was, nevertheless, ineffective, Petitioner again did not produce any 
facts showing prejudice. Absent such a showing, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that any genuine 
issue exists with respect to trial counsel's effectiveness. See TS 1 Partnership at 158. 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on claims 16(l)-(q) is granted. 
Subsection 14. Claim 16(r) 
Here, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel "should have objected to the specific statements 
in the prosecutor's opening that were argumentative and not merely to show the jury what 
evidence would be submitted." Mem. in Opp. at 48. Petitioner does not identify the statements 
and does not show the connection between lack of objection and the outcome of the trial. 
Again Petitioner has failed to submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists concerning trial counsel's effectiveness with respect to the alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(r). 
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Subsection 15. Claim 16(s) 
In claim 16(s), Petitioner asserts that "trial counsel failed to adequately advise [him] as to 
whether or not [he] should testify in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial where he would be 
subject to cross-examination." Amended Petition at 20. Petitioner further says that his trial 
counsel "did not specifically help or warn Petitioner about the dangers of testifying in the guilt 
phase. A non-testifying opportunity would have brought a different result." Mem. in Opp. at 49. 
These statements are allegations. In support of these allegations, Petitioner should have 
provided specific facts but he failed to do so. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on 
claim 16(s). 
Subsection 16. Claim 16ft) 
Claim 16(t) alleges that trial counsel "failed to have bench conferences transcribed to 
preserve the record of the proceedings, even though this was a death penalty case." Amended 
Petition at 20. Petitioner explains that defense attorneys are trained to have all the bench 
conferences in capital cases recorded. Mem. in Opp. at 49. 
Here, again, Petitioner did not show prejudice by specific facts. It is not clear how 
recordings of the bench conferences would have produced a different outcome for the Petitioner. 
Without this showing, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that there is a genuine issues with respect to 
trial counsel's ineffective assistance. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on 
claim 16(t). 
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V. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel at the Penalty Phase 
Subsection 1. Claim 17(a) 
In claim 17(a), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
the improper opening statement of the prosecutor. Petitioner also states that trial "counsel should 
have objected to the specific statements in the prosecutor's opening that were argumentative and 
not merely to show the jury what evidence would be submitted." Mem. in Opp. at 48. 
Petitioner does not identify the argumentative statements and does not show how 
counsel's objection would have affected the outcome of the trial. Petitioner did not present 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Respondent is 
entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(a). 
Subsection 2. Claim 17(b) 
Petitioner argues in claim 17(b) that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to "make 
an opening statement informing the jury of [Petitioner's] position." Amended Petition at 21. 
Respondent has not requested summary judgment on this claim; perhaps this was an oversight. In 
any event, Petitioner's response is silent as to this claim. 
However, Petitioner did not show that the outcome of the penalty phase would have 
probably been different if his counsel made a more effective opening statement. On this ground, 
Respondent would be entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(b). 
Subsection 3. Claim 17(c) 
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Claim 17(c) alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to "object to the 
presentation of highly prejudicial victim impact testimony." Id. Petitioner argues that because the 
state of the law is always in flux, objections should routinely be made in order to preserve 
defendant's rights. 
Even if trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the victim impact evidence, 
Petitioner has not shown that the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different but for 
trial counsel's alleged deficiency4. Because Petitioner has not shown prejudice, Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on claim 17(c) is granted. 
Subsection 4. Claim 17(d) 
In claim 17(d), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in "presenting] 
witnesses who were detrimental to [Petitioner] and who gave aggravation evidence rather than 
mitigation evidence." Amended Petition at 21. Petitioner further states that trial counsel "should 
have had sufficient understanding and knowledge of what his witnesses would testify to in the 
penalty phase part of the trial, and not put on evidence that is harmful to his client." Mem. in 
Opp. at 50-51. 
Petitioner does not identify these witnesses nor the parts of their testimony that were 
Petitioner also cannot prove prejudice On dn ect appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the victim impact 
evidence m this case was moderate in tone, descriptive of the family's loss and mourning but not militant or angry, and 
contained no effort to pressure the jury to impose the death penalty Absent its pi esence m the penalty phase, we see no 
possibility that the jury's verdict would have been different, based as it clearly was on the acts and character of the 
defendant." Kell at 1036, ^ [54. 
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aggravating. He only makes an unsupported allegation of ineffectiveness. Therefore, Respondent 
is entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(d). 
Subsection 5. Claim 17fe) 
In claim 17(e), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to "object to improper closing 
arguments from the prosecution." Amended Petition at 21. Petitioner argues that prosecutorial 
misconduct should always draw an objection, and that by not objecting his counsel failed to 
preserve an issue for appeal. 
Petitioner does not identify the improper arguments presented by the prosecutor. 
Petitioner also did not demonstrate with reasonable probability how a proper objection would 
have changed the outcome of the penalty phase. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
as to the prejudicial effect of counsel's errors. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary 
judgment on claim 17(e). 
VI. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Subsection 1. Standard of Review 
Effective assistance of appellate counsel is a right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v Lucey, 469 US 387, 396 (1985). Ineffectiveness of 
appellate counsel is judged under the same standard as ineffectiveness of trial counsel. See Smith 
v. Robbins, 528 US 259, 285 (2000); Bruner v Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996). This 
standard requires Petitioner to "first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in 
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failing to find arguable issues to appeal." Robbins at 285. If Petitioner "succeeds in such a 
showing, he then has the burden of demonstrating prejudice.'Td. To demonstrate prejudice, 
Petitioner must show "a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unreasonable failure to 
file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal." Id. 
Appellate counsel is not required to raise every possible issue on appeal. See Carter v. 
Galetka at 639, ^48. Only failure to raise a "dead-bang winner" claim is considered to be 
deficient performance. See Id.; see also Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392-93, 395 (10th Cir. 1995). 
The Tenth Circuit initially defined a claim as a "dead-bang winner" if it "was obvious 
from the trial record ... and ... would have resulted in a reversal on appeal." Cook at 395 
(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court, however, did not adopt this language. Rather, the 
Carter Court adopted language from the Banks decision which defined "dead-bang winner" "as 
an 'issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in 
reversal on appeal.'" Carter at 640, [^48 (emphasis added), citing Banks at 1515 n.13. 
Therefore, in order for the petitioner to avoid summary judgment on any claims that 
allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he must demonstrate that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to the following elements. First, appellate counsel's failure to 
raise an issue which was obvious from the trial record. Second, the issue must be one which 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. 
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Subsection 2. Claim 18(a) 
Here, Petitioner argues that the appeal of his conviction and death sentence was affirmed 
"as a result of ineffective counsel." Amended Petition at 21. This general allegation identifies no 
specific issue that his counsel failed to raise and which would have probably resulted in reversal 
on appeal. 
Petitioner's Memorandum hi Opposition also contains a general allegation that his 
"conviction and sentence were obtained and his appeal was rejected because of ineffective 
assistance both at the trial and the appellate level." At 52. Because Petitioner has failed to 
identify a specific issue or issues, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 18(a). 
Subsection 3. Claim 18(b) 
In claim 18(b), Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
"adequately brief and raise relevant issues on appeal."Amended Petition at 21. Respondent did 
not request summary judgment on this claim; perhaps this was an oversight. 
However, even if the issues raised in Petitioner's post-conviction petition were obvious 
from the trial record and should have been raised or more adequately briefed on appeal, 
Petitioner fails to address how these issues would have resulted in reversal on appeal. Therefore, 
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 18(b). 
Subsection 4. Claim 18(c) 
Petitioner asserts in claim 18(c) that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing "to raise 
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the issue of the legality of [Petitioner's] transfer from Nevada to Utah." Id. As in claim 16(j), 
Petitioner argues that an illegal transfer violated his due process rights. 
The decision on this claim is the same as on claim 16(j). Petitioner's due process 
argument relies on his self-defense claim, which was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court on 
appeal. See Kell at 1028-29, ffl[22-25. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on 
claim 18(c). 
Subsection 5. Claim 18(d) 
In claim 18(d), Petitioner concludes that "[ajbsent the errors and omissions of trial and 
appellate counsel, there is a reasonable likelihood that petitioner would not have been convicted 
of aggravated murder, and a reasonable likelihood that petitioner would not have been sentenced 
to death." Amended Petition at 21. Although this statement is under the heading "Kell's 
Appellate counsel was ineffective" in Petitioner's post-conviction petition, it is clearly not an 
assertion of a claim for relief but a legal conclusion. 
Conclusion 
In his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner raises several claims and 
sub-claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Petitioner argues that these 
claims demonstrate that his conviction is unconstitutional. Respondent moved for summary 
judgment on all of the Petitioner's claims. After considering all of the issues raised, the Court 
grants Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment on claims 8, 9, 10, 
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11, 13(a), 14, 15 (a), 15(b), 16 (a)-(t), that portion of claim 16(e) which alleges ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel in failing to seek interlocutory review of the trial court's decision to try Petitioner at 
the CUCF, claims 17(a)-(e), and 18(a)-(d). 
Order 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief is 
dismissed. 
This Ruling and Order constitutes the final order of the Court. No further order is 
necessary to effectuate the Court's decision. Digitally signed by David L Mower 
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Addendum D 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GUILT PHASE OF THE TRIAL, Case number 
941600213, Page-7-
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to 
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from that 
witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give it what 
weight you think it deserves. 
14. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT 
IS GUILTY? 
The State of Utah is the one making the accusations in this case. It is responsible to 
convince you that the crime was committed by the defendant. 
According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by 
assuming it. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard against the danger of an 
innocent person being unjustly punished. 
15. HOW CONVINCED SHOULD THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your assumption the defendant is innocent, you must be strongly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt. You must have no reasonable doubt about it. 
16. WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation, 
supposition, emotion or sympathy. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as would 
be retained by reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration of all the 
evidence, and must arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
mstg 
Addendum E 
INSTRUCTION NO. P5 
The burden of proof described as "beyond a reasonable doubt" is used and referred to in 
several places in these instructions. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to be 
an absolute certainty. A reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense and not on 
speculation or imagination. It is a doubt that is reasonable in view of all of the evidence. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt must satisfy the mind and convince those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon such proof. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable men and women 
would hold after consideration of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
You must keep in mind in assessing whether the State has met its burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the burden never shifts to the defendant. 
Addendum F 
May 21st fight between Payne and Blackmon, but before he murdered 
Blackmon (VIII:4839). 
110. The letter is reproduced below. The underlined 
portions are what the jury saw during the guilt phase. 
Dear Luther, 
Thank you for the B-day card, very nice 
surprise. I feel bad for not at least 
writing you and yours but you were in my 
thoughts that 30th day of March. At the time 
I had just been sent to their one and only 
other joint. CUCF PO Box 550 Gunnison, Utah 
84634 - it's the same but only has up to a 
level 3 - which is G.P. Level 2 is mini max 
and Level 1 which is where I'm at is max. 
I've only been here 2 1/2 months and have 
picked up a case possibly. Had to introduce 
the S.W.A.T. team "gooners" what a headbutt 
to the face felt like. Ha. Ha. He got a 
little nose bleed and a split lip - but so 
did I once they got me down. . . . [Picture 
of frowning face.] From what people tell me 
around here I'll be getting charged. I guess 
it's the first time someone has gotten one of 
their swat fags. He was another sympathizer. 
So you know how that goes. x'Can't be having 
that." Ha. Ha. 
This joint is built almost just like 
Ely, but have 32 cells instead of 48 and have 
solid windows on the bubble with no guns. 
That can be seen anyways. So you know how I 
like that. [Picture of smiling face.] They 
don't come on the tier unless everyone is in 
their cells. It's ran like transition use to 
be. Upstairs is all lockdown single cell 
which is where I'm at for the moment. I got 
30 days D-D and a 35$ fine for the headbutt 
not bad huh?? Downstairs gets 4 hours out 2 
on the teir 2 on the yard a day. 8 out at a 
time. And you have a cellie. They let us 
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have water bags to workout with on the teir, 
so its not to bad. Plus the porter and food 
handler jobs are pay #'s. Right now the race 
relations aren't to good. It seems a wood 
Twhite inmates sometimes refer to each other 
as woods (VIII:4838)1 decided to brake a 
little nappy headed niggers jaw, so nappy's 
cellie comes out on the tier who is like 250 
and 6'4 he gets intercepted by my training 
partner who is 5 inches shorter and 50 pounds 
lighter than the monkey but is a gun slingen 
motherfucker. When the nigger come out he 
runs into a front kick to the gut and a fist 
to the head - the monkey drops. Paul gets to 
running a set to the back of the nigs head. 
The pigs start spraying the fire hose - yeah 
that's right a fire hose - no guns - but they 
got a mean fire hose — ha-ha - so Paul slips 
- the nig gets a few shots in but neither can 
do anything - fucken firehose takes paint off 
the walls - so they get up smiling saying 
yeah that was alright - the nig and Paul turn 
to lockdown and the nig fire's on him, so 
Paul moves in a dry spot that the toad can't 
get too under my cell by the stairs and tells 
the toad come over here where its dry. The 
nig is in his doorway and doesn't want 
anymore. Paul plans to go in after the nig. 
He yells up at me if the thing was out I said 
yeah. He comes up to get the dag. Gets it 
and starts back down the stairs. The toad is 
getting his door shut while he's going down 
the stairs - so the nigs start talking shit. 
And there's only G-monkeys on the teir - but 
only the two woods that got into it and 
myself will do anything to these inferior 
fucks. The rest are white slags and are 
scared. The whites here have no racial pride 
or even a small amount of loyalty. And it 
makes me sick. The foods good and the pay 
#'s everything else sucks . . . It'11 be 
interesting to see how things go in about 20 
days. Be all alone with 4 niggers "I hate it 
when that happens"' Ha-ha. As for Jobber 
[illegible] he called the house asking for a 
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little help for some soap to wash his ass. 
Guess they got him in Tracy on a teir with 
only one other white and he's on pipe. Ha. 
Ha. Sounds real fun there. Hopefully he'll 
be able to get around some woods soon. I 
know it has to be better for him then how it 
was there, even though its fucked up for 
awhile because you mis everyone and are used 
to talking a certain way as in joking. Its 
hard to relate to dudes that are in a total 
different mind set. Thats the hardest part. 
I only talk to the two woods I've already 
mentioned about you guys and the shit we've 
done. The loyalty, pride and looking out for 
each other. And they have a hard time 
understanding it because its not like that 
here. The Mexicans and niggers do it but not 
the whites. And when I run down some ideas 
of mostly personal thoughts of white power 
tactics they really get to triped and think 
I'm wacked out of my mind. Ha. Ha. I'm 
still trying to find my way home from that 
water [picture of smiling face]. Speaking of 
wacked out of water heads I better mention 
Steve and Joey. I would say something to 
Duremy but I already know his story spoon in 
one hand and a donutt in the other. Sorry 
fat fuck can't even say Hi. I would write 
everyone their own letter but can't handle 
all that shit. So one letter will have to 
do. I do need to say something about 
Graveyard. Hopefully soon. Willie - now 
Jobber did run down the act of Treason that 
he commited. It seems from what Big T says 
is that this guy is down in the county jail 
running his mouth throwing Big T's name and 
survival trip in some bullshit about access 
to certain things. Now I don't know if 
anyone can get around him. But that shit has 
to come to a stop. He had been sent back 
before anything could be done. 
Steve thanks for the card. Very nice touch. 
Reminded me of when I used to grind on Lou and 
bring my hands around to squeeze on his tittys. 
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Ha. Ha. Then again his card reminded me of 
watching you strip down for the yard. Nice Ass. 
[Picture of a smiling face.] It sounds like you 
guys are doing alright - when ever I come back 
I'll have plenty of literaturer they almost let 
anything in so thats how I'm spending much of my 
celltime. At least trying to anyway. Lately it's 
been plot, strategy of inflicting pain on a 
nigger. I'm getting to old for this shit though. 
My hairs falling out, my [illegible] mind is 
going, and my body is beat down. [Picture of 
frowning face]. Ha. Ha. Now that I'm not 
there your probably the best looking wood out 
of the bunch. But thats not saying much 
considering H have no hair and the other H 
have no teeth. [Picture of smiling face with 
missing teeth.] Nice art work. I know I 
don't write everyone I should but please give 
my love to folks, Raymond, Italy, Pete, and 
Darren. Also make sure Lou stays on the Iron 
pile and not the water pile. I've been 
drinking a little but havent fucked with the 
other shit. I'll yell at Joey and shoot this 
to ya. 
Joey Well. Well are we lonely. [Picture 
of frowning face.] I'm lonely too so don't 
feel alone. You still have Pat, Darren and 
foot, don't you? Tell 'em I said Hi. I 
planned on writing you right back but have 
been going through some changes myself. The 
reason I have never called is because these 
people have a very strange phone system I 
have to have everyone approved. I have to 
press in my back # then the phone # its all 
done by machine they call first to make sure 
its alright for me to call then its screened. 
So that's why. Fuck that shit. Have they 
still got you strained up or what? How about 
getting sent back to Illinois what ever 
happened to that?? Things on this end will 
be getting live soon. Looks like I'll have 
to show me a nappy headed monkey what some of 
this white power is all about. They seem to 
never learn. . . . Anyway you know I mis the 
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shit out of everyone. One of these days I'll 
find away to get a picture taken to send ya. 
Maybe one like foot got in unit 7 with a dead 
nigger on the floor in front of his cell and 
foot eating a sandwich at his window. I 
loved that one. It'll be hard to top that. . 
. . Well its about time to jack my cock. 
You guys be cool. 
Love ya 
(State's Exhibit 7 and 7-X (addendum B); R. 1926-29 (addendum C). 
See also II:3328-3352;VIII:4755-62, 4829-40.) 
111. Defense counsel argued that the letter was not 
relevant to any issue. The trial court, however, agreed with the 
State's contention that the letter was relevant to show that 
Kell's motives for killing Blackmon included racial bias and 
retaliating against Blackmon's "cheap shot" against Payne. 
(11:3332-52; VIII:4757-62.) 
112. The State announced that it would introduce the 
letter's redacted portions at the penalty phase, if the case 
progressed that far (11:3352). 
113. Just before the letter was introduced, defense counsel 
again argued that the trial court should exclude it. However, he 
agreed that he was satisfied with the redactions as done. (VIII: 
4757-58.) 
114. Kell testified at trial that his references to 
"inflicting pain on a nigger" and showing "a nappy headed monkey 
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